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Abstract 
 
 In the past ten years Web Services have positioned themselves to be one of the leading 
distributed technologies. The technology, supported by major IT companies, offers 
specifications to many challenges in a distributed environment like strong interface and 
message contacts, service discovery, reliable message exchange and advanced security 
mechanisms. On the other hand, all these specifications have made Web Services very 
complex and the industry is struggling to implement those in a standardized manner. 
            REST based services, also known as RESTful services, are based on pure HTTP and 
have risen as competitors to Web Services, mainly because of their simplicity. Now they are 
being adopted by the majority of the big industry corporations including Microsoft, Yahoo 
and Google, who have deprecated or passed on Web Services in favor of RESTful services. 
However, RESTful services have been criticized for lacking functionality offered by Web 
Services, especially message-level security. Since security is an important functionality which 
may tip the scale in a negative direction for REST based services, this thesis proposes a 
prototype solution for message-level security for RESTful services. The solution is for the 
most part technical and utilizes well-known, cross-platform mechanisms which are composed 
together while a smaller part of the solution discusses a non-technical approach regarding the 
token distribution. During the development of the prototype, much of the focus was to adapt 
the solution according to the REST principals and guidelines, such are multi-format support 
(XML or JSON) and light-weight, human readable messages. 
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1 Introduction 
 Chapter 1 represents a starting point for this thesis and starts by introducing the 
motivation for the work. The chapter continues with presenting research goals, scope, 
research method and ends with a description of the way the thesis is structured.  
1.1 Motivation and background 
 Distributed computing enables data exchange across computers, regardless of their 
geographical localization. Data that is exchanged is often business related, meaning that 
one company subscribes on business critical data delivered by another company. Through 
a contract both companies agree upon a format and a structure of the data and how often 
data exchange should occur. From the beginning of a relatively short history of distributed 
computing, many distributed systems emerged presenting alternative approaches of 
accomplishing the data exchange across different parties. Newer alternatives offered easier 
programming interface, more functionality and better performance. One of those 
approaches was Web Services which came into the market in the late 1990s. They were 
specified and driven by the big software vendors like Microsoft and IBM. Web Services 
offered not only data exchange, but also tried to accomplish interoperability between 
different programming languages basing the entire data definition and data exchange on 
the well-known technologies, XML and HTTP. Since two major software companies 
began standardizing on Web Services many others followed, and in the early 2000s Web 
Services framework, originally consisting of three separate specifications, begun to 
position itself as a de-facto distributed technology. As soon as the industry started using 
Web Services new requirements became reality. One of those requirements was the end-to-
end security or message-based security, which means securing messages until they reach 
their final destination regardless of the amount of intermediaries or how well the network 
is secured. In the years to follow many security related specifications for Web Services 
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appeared, extending the Web Services and enabling advanced security mechanisms, like 
cryptography, trust negotiation and single sign-on. But all those extensions did not just 
solve the challenges that the industry posed, they also made the Web Services one of the 
most complex distributed systems of the modern time. Today, creating a Web Service 
without the use of third-party tools is almost impossible, especially when it comes to 
extensions for message-based security. 
 REST, an architectural style based on existing HTTP functionality, was described 
around the same time as the Web Services originated but since it was not backed by big 
corporations its inception was almost unnoticed. Several years after its original description, 
services based on REST, also called RESTful services, began to gain more popularity in 
the developer community, mainly due to their simplicity. As the time moved on the 
industry started to pay more attention to the developer communities and started to offer 
services based on REST. Since RESTful services gained momentum it became the target of 
comparison against Web Services. One of the functionalities RESTful services are missing 
is the ability to ensure end-to-end security. While standard REST security is defined on the 
transport level by enabling TLS/SSL it does not impose security on the messages directly 
but instead it secures the transport layer. Once an intermediary party receives the data from 
the sender, the message becomes unsecured and its content visible in its original format. 
This is in contrast to end-to-end security principals which ensure secured message content 
until its final destination. End-to-end security is also known to protect the content of 
certain parts of the message while other parts may be left intact. This is often done to allow 
message routing based on those unprotected parts that are understandable. Such processes 
are often handled by intermediate systems like enterprise application integration systems 
(EAI) or enterprise service bus (ESB), which are implemented in many larger companies 
and responsible for routing and transformation of the incoming and outgoing messages. 
The messages are often routed to their final destination systems based on certain parts of 
the message content. 
 In our opinion, not offering end-to-end security may be the biggest limitation 
regarding REST architecture. This absent functionality may lead to discouragement of 
choosing RESTful services when working with sensitive data. In some cases this may also 
lead to creation of unstandardized workarounds. Therefore, in this thesis we want to 
propose a solution to end-to-end security for RESTful services. The thesis itself is a result 
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of the author’s curiosity for the REST architecture and is not written in context of any 
ongoing project. 
 The case study that will be used to test the solution is based on an application for 
customer registration. Even though the case study is fictive, we believe that we are 
covering many test scenarios and through those we are able to relate to the real life security 
challenges. 
1.2 Research goals 
 The main objective of this thesis is to propose a solution for enabling message-
based security for RESTful services. This includes message integrity and confidentiality, 
user authentication and token distribution. Before the design process we saw the need to 
investigate message-level security solutions and approaches implemented on similar 
technologies so to be more inspired and accumulate new knowledge. In order to support 
message-level security in RESTful services we knew we had to solve challenges regarding 
some basic RESTful capabilities like format flexibility and simple, human readable 
messages. Format flexibility is a feature where a message may be defined in multiple 
formats, thus our implementation had to be adoptable to this behavior and be able to ensure 
integrity and confidentiality on multiple formats. Simple and human readable messages is a 
REST architecture trademark where the message content is defined in a plain manner and 
as such is in contrast to complicated multi-schema constrained formats like SOAP or RDF. 
Our goal was to keep the messages in a simple manner even after integrity and 
confidentiality has been applied. 
Finally, the ultimate goal was to create a new library that would solve many of the 
challenges regarded message-level security and the library was to be developed in a 
widely-used REST API in order to target bigger developer audience. 
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1.3 Scope 
 The investigation of an existing approach for message-level security was based on 
Web Services. Although there are many differences between the Web Services and 
RESTful services, we found them to be similar in certain areas since both support XML as 
message format and utilize HTTP to exchange data. The investigation part is described in 
chapter 3. 
 While RESTful messages may be exposed through multiple formats, in this thesis 
there was a focus on protecting XML and JSON formats since they are some of the most 
used ones. XML is a standard format for representing data in a structured manner[5](p.8). 
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) is also used for representation of structured data but its 
design goals are to be “minimal, portable, textual, and a subset of JavaScript”[81]. Because 
of this JSON offers simpler structure and size than XML. 
  Further on, we found WCF framework to be the most used one for the creation of 
the RESTful services on the .NET platform. The .NET platform is a Microsoft developed 
software platform containing libraries, tools and runtimes to develop and execute software. 
The platform allows software to be developed in several programming languages such as 
C#, VB.NET and J#[53]. WCF is an acronym for Windows Communication Foundation 
and is a universal framework for building distributed services on the .NET 
platform[82](p.1). It is also probably one of the most used APIs for RESTful services in 
general. This claim is based on forum discussions and by searching for books and RESTful 
on www.amazon.com where the search engine produced many WCF related books[107]. 
That is why we used .NET and WCF to develop the security library prototype.  
Additionally, C# was chosen as the programming language. 
 So to create a smoother implementation on the existing RESTful projects and avoid 
create dependencies upon additional libraries, our new security library was developed 
solely by libraries included in the .NET platform and WCF, i.e. no third-party libraries 
were used. This was done intentionally to ease the adoption of the new library. 
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1.4 Research method 
 For this thesis a technological research method was applied. The research method is 
described in Technology Research Explained, written by Solheim and Stølen[98]. As stated 
by the authors this research method is “concerned about how to make new artefacts or 
improve existing”[98](p.7), which is what we were trying to achieve in this work. 
1.4.1 Description 
 The research process starts by collecting requirements for the artefact. When 
requirements are in place the process continues by designing and creating an artefact. This 
is the innovative phase requiring creativity and technical insight of the researcher. At the 
end, the produced artefact has to demonstrate that it actually fulfills the specified 
requirements and satisfies the need on which it is based. The overall hypothesis is: The 
artefact satisfies the need. The overall hypothesis can be evaluated positively if the 
falsifiable predictions derived from the posed requirements converge. If the evaluation 
results diverge, the researcher has to repeat the whole process resulting in adjusting the 
requirements, possibly build a new artefact and evaluate it. Figure 1.1 shows this iterative 
activity. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Technology research steps [98] 
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1.4.2 Problem Analysis 
 Our thesis is concerned with offering a complete solution for message-level 
security for RESTful services. Before we started with planning of the solution we studied 
similar functionalities offered by Web Services. We realized that our solution will need to 
address three separate modules: 
1. Authentication 
2. Token distribution 
3. Message protection 
 In this thesis authentication and token distribution are modules that did not require 
development of any new artefacts, as shown in the sections 4.3.2, 4.3.3 and 4.3.4, but they 
did require creativity and technical insight, token distribution in particular.  
 The only module that required development of new artefacts was the message 
protection module. Message protection module is the one responsible for encrypting and 
applying digital signatures on XML and JSON messages in the context of WCF REST 
API. At the end, message protection module resulted in what we refer to as the new 
security library for RESTful services. 
1.4.3 Innovation 
 Before we started on the design and development of the message protection module 
we needed to identify requirements for it. Those requirements are presented in section 2.1. 
After requirements were specified, we did a small proof of concept on WCF, SOAP and 
REST API to learn more about those implementations and look for reusable components. 
The ultimate goal of proof of concept was to prepare us better for the planning process and 
this is presented in section 4.2. 
 While the innovation part which includes design and implementation was well-
planned in our opinion, there were times when we had to reconsider the design due to the 
problems related to the implementation. Design and implementation are presented in 
chapter 4 and 5 respectively. 
Outline 
7 
 
 
1.4.4 Evaluation 
 The evaluation part is the one confirming if the expected predictions meet our 
expectations. As mentioned earlier, predictions are based on requirements and both are 
presented in the chapter 2 while the evaluation of the predictions is presented in the 
chapter 6. 
1.5 Outline 
 The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides success criteria in 
form of requirements, predictions and hypothesis which the final solution is evaluated by. 
Chapter 3 presents an overview of the distributed architectures discussed in this thesis, 
Web Services and RESTful services, and their security repertoire. The solution design is 
thoroughly discussed in chapter 4, whereas the implementation, technical details and test 
results regarding message size, are presented in chapter 5. Chapter 6 provides an 
evaluation to predictions and hypothesis made in chapter 2 while chapter 7 sums up the 
work done and presents further work. Additionally, the thesis includes two appendices 
where Appendix A explains the DVD content and the structure of the solution, while 
Appendix B explains the sample code found on the DVD. 
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2 Criteria 
Following sections describe requirements, predictions and hypothesis that will be used 
to guide us through the development process and evaluate the final product. 
2.1 Requirements 
 There is a set of absolute requirements that we feel should be fulfilled in order to 
support real-life security scenarios. These absolute requirements form the basis and reflect 
the purpose of our solution. 
 
R1: The very first requirement relates to the formats of RESTful services. By  
 developing a service in WCF, a RESTful service may offer either XML or JSON  
 format. Therefore, the solution needs to support encryption and digital signatures  
 for XML and JSON formats. 
R2: The second requirement is about full and partial message security. Regarding the 
 nature of systems responsible for message routing, some properties or elements 
 must be in clear text so that the message may be routed to the specific end system. 
 In some cases the requirement can be to encrypt certain properties and sign those. 
 In other cases the requirement can be to sign a combination of both encrypted and 
 unencrypted properties. Therefore, the solution needs to support different 
 combination schemes of encryption and digital signatures for the complete 
 message or selected message properties. 
R3: The third requirement is concerned with the overhead upon a RESTful message. 
 Since a RESTful message is a pure representation of the domain object in one of 
 the supported formats, the message is easy to read for the humans, especially when 
 compared to SOAP messages. Therefore, when encryption and signature are 
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 applied, the message should not become much larger and should be simple to 
 read. 
R4: The fourth requirement relates to the existing RESTful projects. The idea is to 
 design and implement our solution in such way that the existing projects developed 
 in WCF may enable message-based security with least effort. Therefore, the 
 solution must be adaptable with the current RESTful projects developed in WCF. 
R5: The fifth requirement is about the interoperability between different platforms and 
 programming languages. RESTful services are based on HTTP which is heavily 
 supported on all popular platforms. Although our solution is to be created on .NET 
 platform, the secured messages may still be downloaded by another platform but 
 the messages may not be understandable. That is why we should strive to secure 
 and structure messages in that way so a solution created on a different platform may 
 understand those messages without much effort. In other words we should make it 
 easier for a developer developing on a non-.NET platform to create a RESTful 
 client or service, and exchange protected messages with RESTful client or services 
 developed on .NET and WCF. This can be achieved by utilizing well-known 
 security mechanisms, implemented on most of the platforms. Therefore, secured 
 messages should implement cross-platform encryption and digital signature 
 mechanisms in order to be more interoperable. 
 
 Finally, it is worth mentioning areas we will not consider in this thesis. The first 
one is caching which we acknowledge to be important but due to the complexity and time 
limit this functionality will be ignored. The second area is performance which in our case 
may be measured by the time it takes to protect a message or the time is takes to 
accomplish the message exchange. Although an important parameter in every distributed 
environment this will not be on our highest priority list but we will always keep it our mind 
while developing the solution. 
 
Hypothesis 
11 
 
 
2.2 Hypothesis 
This thesis defines following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Proposed solution will enable message-level security for RESTful messages on 
.NET platform. 
2.3 Predictions 
Given that the requirements are specified and the hypothesis is stated we proceed 
with the definition of the predictions or success criteria. These predictions will be used to 
test the hypothesis. 
 
P1:   The new artefact, message protection library, later referred to as the new security 
library, will enable encryption and digital signatures on XML and JSON messages. 
P2: The new artefact will support partial encryption and partial digital signature. 
P3: The new artefact will enable messages compression and decompression on 
protected messages so to decrease message size. 
P4: The new security solution will be easily adoptable by existing and standard WCF 
RESTful services. 
 
 Since P4 is relatively hard to falsify because it is composed by two relative 
statements, “easily adoptable” and “standard”, we feel the need to explain those in more 
details.  
“Easily adoptable” in this context refers to the usage of the new artefact to protect 
the message content which will not require existing service code to be changed but will 
require new code to be added to the existing service solution. In addition it is worth 
mentioning that the authentication and token distribution will be handled outside the 
service code so it will not require any structural changes but will require additional 
configuration to be specified. 
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“Standard” in this context refers to the service code which defines a service, its 
service contract and where none of the HTTP security features are enabled. Those 
“standard” solutions are generally found on the Internet and are often used for 
demonstration purposes. Following link from Microsoft demonstrates what we consider to 
be a standard solution[97]. 
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3 Related work 
3.1 Intro 
 
 This chapter introduces a description of distributed technologies used in this thesis 
and their security mechanisms. It is assumed that the reader has basic knowledge of 
concepts related to programming and XML.  
 The chapter starts with section 3.2 presenting the basic concepts and characteristics 
of a distributed system. The section continues with describing Web Services and RESTful 
services in 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 respectively. Section 3.3 presents general security concepts as 
well as the security of Web Services and Restful services. The first three subsections of 3.3 
are introduction to security systems and security technology. Subsection 3.3.1 starts with 
introducing basic security goals and security terminology. 3.3.2 subsection is about 
cryptography and is divided in three subsections presenting encryption, hash functions and 
digital signatures, each starting by a short historical overview, continuing with description, 
pros and cons, and ending with their field of usage. The subsection 3.3.3 is about 
authentication services, giving introduction about some of the most used authentication 
systems. Security mechanisms in RESTful services are presented in subsection 3.4 while 
security in XML and Web Services are presented in subsections 3.5 and 3.6 respectively. 
We end this chapter by discussing couple of community efforts regarding REST security 
3.7. 
Related work 
14 
 
3.2 Distributed systems 
 According to Coulouris et al., "a distributed system is one in which components 
located at networked computers communicate and coordinate their actions only by passing 
messages"[64](p.1) Computers that are part of the network may be geographically located 
in the same room or far from each other, like on different continents. Probably the most 
famous example of a distributed system is the Internet where millions of computers are 
connected with each other and where data is exchanged between people, applications and 
machines.  
This section introduces the most important and widely accepted concepts and ideas behind 
distributed systems. Moreover, a brief overview of Web Services and RESTful services 
will be given, also pointing to their strengths and weaknesses.  
 One of the simplest but also common models of a distributed system is the client-
server model composed of a server and a client. A server is a machine hosting an 
application that offers resources valuable to the clients. A client is a machine that runs a 
client application able to communicate with the server application and collect or update the 
resource. A distributed system offers many challenges that generally do not apply to 
standalone systems. These challenges are described in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1: Challenges in a distributed system [64](p.16-24) 
Heterogenity: A distributed system is composed of the modules that runs on different 
hardware, networks, operating systems and are made in different 
programming languages 
Openness: A distributed system should be extensible for its consumers by 
publicly publishing its interfaces 
Security: Communication between multiple computers must be protected 
Scalability: A distributed system should avoid performance bottlenecks when a 
new user is introduced 
Failure handling: A distributed system must avoid single point of failure, meaning that if 
a failure should occur in a process, a machine or a network, it should 
not bring the whole system down 
Concurrency: A distributed system must ensure multiple operations at a time. In 
addition it must ensure that all those operations are independent of 
each other 
Transparency: A distributed system should make certain aspects invisible to make it 
easier for the programmer to concentrate on the application 
development rather than details about the distributed system 
implementation. 
 
 Through the history of computer science many distributed systems organized as 
middleware emerged. A middleware is term for a software providing a programming 
model, transparency and independence above the building blocks like communication 
protocols, operating systems and hardware [64](p.166). The middleware can be divided 
into four categories by the way they function[65]. Those categories are: remote procedure 
call, object oriented middleware, transaction oriented middleware and message oriented 
middleware. 
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Table 3.2: Middleware categories 
Remote procedure call (RPC): Enables remote invoking of the procedures as if they 
were internal procedure calls by using interface 
definition language (IDL). Much like traditional 
procedure calls, remote procedure calls are 
synchronous which means that the caller waits for a 
response from the procedure[61]. Examples of RPC 
are Sun RPC and Isis. 
Object-oriented middleware: Beyond RPC, IDL supports object types as 
parameters. In addition it supports inheritance and 
failure handling[62]. Examples of object oriented 
middleware are CORBA, Java RMI and DCOM. 
Transactional-oriented 
middleware: 
Support transactions across different distributed 
database systems by implementing two-phase commit 
protocol[63]. An example of transaction oriented 
middleware is ODTP XA. 
Message-oriented middleware: Sends and retrieves messages to and from a queue 
system by encompassing publish/subscribe and 
message queuing communication patterns[61]. 
Asynchronous communication is the natural choice of 
this category. Examples of the message oriented 
middleware are JMS and Microsoft MSMQ. 
3.2.1 Web Services 
 
 The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) defines a Web Service as “a software 
system identified by a URI, whose public interfaces and bindings are defined and described 
using XML. Its definition can be discovered by other software systems. These systems 
may then interact with the Web service in a manner prescribed by its definition, using 
XML based messages conveyed by Internet protocols.”[66]. Rajendran & Balasubramanie 
has a slightly different definition where “Web Service refers to a modular, self-contained 
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piece of code with a well-defined functionality that you can access across the 
network.”[67]. 
 Web Services, also known as SOAP based services, are an industry standard used 
by many companies and organizations[86]. They are formed out of three separate 
specifications, each defining its own domain of usage. The first specification is SOAP 
which is a protocol for message exchange, described in XML[72]. The second 
specification, WSDL, is also described in XML and provides information about network 
services, their requirements and returning values[73]. The third specification is UDDI 
which is described in XML as the other two specifications, and which provides a way to 
register service descriptions, find service descriptions by specifying a criteria and retrieve 
descriptions[74]. All these specifications are required to be implemented in order to deliver 
a complete distributed system. Today, multiple programming languages have implemented 
these specifications consequently enabling cross-platform message exchange, service 
description and service discovery[88]. 
 By default, Web Services builds on the Internet protocols TCP/IP and HTTP to 
send and receive messages. HTTP is not the only application level protocol supported but 
it is the mostly chosen one since firewalls often do not prevent HTTP communication on 
port 80 as it might be the case with other protocols or ports.  
 Web Services may be seen as part of RPC middleware category since their 
communication involves calling procedures residing on another computer. The 
communication is initiated by client sending request messages to a service hosted on a 
server. The server processes the request and sends a respond message back to the client. 
Since Web Service provides abstracted failure handling and allow objects to be passed as 
parameters when making remote calls, we may say that the Web Services mirrors 
similarities found in the object-oriented middleware. However, there exist additional 
specifications that extend the original Web Services capabilities and make them somehow 
compatible with the other two middleware categories. These additional specifications are 
known as WS-*. A WS-* specification like WS-AtomicTransaction[70] extends the SOAP 
protocol and enables two-phase protocol and distributed transactions between multiple 
parties, thus fulfilling one of the main requirements for transaction-oriented middleware. 
Message-oriented middleware requires asynchronous message exchange based on 
publish/subscribe pattern where message delivery is ensured. Web Services achieve similar 
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qualifications by implementing WS-Eventing[68], another WS-* specification, enabling 
asynchronous communication and publish/subscribe pattern, while WS-
ReliableMessaging[69] specification can be used to ensure message delivery. 
3.2.1.1 SOAP 
 SOAP, a W3C recommendation, is a platform independent protocol for message 
exchange described in XML. Abbreviation originally stood for Simple Object Access 
Protocol but of version 1.2 the acronym was dropped[72]. 
 In 1998 a group of developers from Microsoft, Userland Software and 
DevelopMentor Incorporated started on the SOAP project. Later on, other companies like 
IBM contributed on the project which formed SOAP version 1.1[75]. The basic blocks of a 
SOAP message have been consistent since its first version. A SOAP message starts with of 
a top XML element called Envelope and a specific namespace, uniquely defining for the 
whole world that the XML document is a SOAP message. The namespace may either have 
the value of http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope describing SOAP 1.1 or 
http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope describing SOAP 1.2. Enevelope-element 
contains two sub elements called Header and Body. Header-element is optional and 
contains additional information about the message exchange like security mechanism used 
to protect the message. Body-element contains the message itself where the message is 
either an operation described in XML or a returning XML type.  If it is a request message 
from a client then the message will contain the operation name and its parameters if 
required. On the server the operation will be mapped to an executable method and 
executed. After its execution, the service will create a SOAP response message containing 
the returning type from the operation.  
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POST /Service/Soap11 HTTP/1.1 
Content-Type: text/xml; charset=utf-8 
SOAPAction: "urn:ICustomerService/GetListOfCustomersByName" 
Host: ana2 
Content-Length: 163 
Expect: 100-continue 
 
<s:Envelope xmlns:s="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"> 
 <s:Body> 
  <GetListOfCustomersByName> 
   <name>Ola</name> 
  </GetListOfCustomersByName> 
 </s:Body> 
</s:Envelope> 
Figure 3.1: SOAP request 
 
HTTP/1.1 200 OK 
Content-Length: 693 
Content-Type: text/xml; charset=utf-8 
Server: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/1.0 
Date: Fri, 01 Apr 2011 13:49:41 GMT 
 
<s:Envelope xmlns:s="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"> 
 <s:Header> 
   <ActivityId CorrelationId="26ab7785-dd9f-432a-a57a-7a29d0270a3e" 
Xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/2004/09/ServiceModel/Diagnostics"> 
 353d7ea9-7603-4ecc-a1e7-53d3e9338f66 
   </ActivityId> 
 </s:Header> 
 <s:Body> 
  <GetListOfCustomersByNameResponse> 
   <GetListOfCustomersByNameResult xmlns:i="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"> 
    <Customer> 
     <Id>14</Id> 
     <LastName>Normann</LastName> 
     <Name>Ola</Name> 
     <Address> 
       <Id>0</Id> 
       <PostalCode>1567</PostalCode> 
       <Street>Christian Michelsens gate 6</Street> 
       <City>OSLO</City> 
     </Address> 
    </Customer> 
   </GetListOfCustomersByNameResult> 
  </GetListOfCustomersByNameResponse> 
 </s:Body> 
</s:Envelope> 
Figure 3.2: SOAP response 
 
 The previous two figures demonstrate SOAP request and response on the HTTP. 
SOAP messages are wrapped in the Envelope-element and belong to the HTTP body part 
while the data prior to Envelope defines the HTTP header. The SOAP request specifies an 
operation called GetCustomerByName with a parameter Name and parameter value Ola. 
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The service is found on the location, also referred to as URI, 
http://ana2/ICustomerService/GetListOfCustomersByName which in this case is defined 
concatenating values found in the Host and SOAPAction header properties. The SOAP 
response message contains Customer-objects where each customer contains members like 
name, last name and an Address-object containing street name, postal code and city name. 
 Web Service API defined by many programming languages offers transparency for 
operation mapping, creation of the SOAP messages and parsing of the SOAP messages. 
The API is also responsible for creating proxy classes so the programmer does not need to 
know the details about where the service is or how to connect to it. The process of 
transforming types defined in a programming language to and from XML types, also 
known as the serialization and deserialization, and in most cases this transformation is 
handled automatically. The API makes it possible for a programmer, even with poor SOAP 
skills, to start creating and exchanging messages. Figure 3.3 shows C# types before being 
serialized to SOAP types as demonstrated in Figure 3.2.  
 
public class Customer 
{ 
        public int Id { get; set; } 
        public string Name { get; set; } 
        public string LastName { get; set; } 
        public Address Address { get; set; } 
} 
 
public class Address 
{ 
        public int Id { get; set; } 
        public string Street { get; set; } 
        public int PostalCode { get; set; } 
        public string City { get; set; }       
} 
 
Figure 3.3: C# types 
 
 As already mentioned, SOAP messages are often transported on the HTTP but 
many other application protocols or even distributed middleware systems may be used to 
accomplish the same task. For instance, message-oriented middleware like JMS may be 
used to transport the messages from a party to the another[77]. 
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3.2.1.2 Web Services Description Language (WSDL) 
 WSDL , also a W3C recommendation,  provides detailed description about services 
specified in a specific XML format[73]. Its history dates back to year 2000 when the SOAP 
gained wider acceptance and there was a need to describe services and their requirements. 
In the fall of 2000 IBM and Microsoft announced WSDL as a joint accomplishment[75]. 
 A WSDL is often hosted on the same machine as the service. It presents a 
description about operations, operation parameters and returning types to the client. By 
reading the WSDL the Web Services API on the client side knows how to contact the 
service and what may be expected from it. Nevertheless, the WSDL is optional and is not 
required if the clients know how to send and retrieve messages from the Web Service or 
the definition has been documented in another way. 
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> 
<wsdl:definitions targetNamespace="" xmlns:wsdl="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/"    
         xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/soap/" xmlns:wsu="http://docs.oasis- 
         open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd"    
         xmlns:soapenc="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/" > 
  <wsdl:types> 
    <xsd:schema targetNamespace="/Imports"> 
      <xsd:import schemaLocation="http://ana2/Service?xsd=xsd0"/> 
      <xsd:import schemaLocation="http://ana2/Service?xsd=xsd1"  
               namespace="http://schemas.microsoft.com/2003/10/Serialization/"/> 
    </xsd:schema> 
  </wsdl:types> 
  <wsdl:message name="ICustomerService_GetListOfCustomersByName_InputMessage"> 
    <wsdl:part name="parameters" element="GetListOfCustomersByName"/> 
  </wsdl:message> 
  <wsdl:message name="ICustomerService_GetListOfCustomersByName_OutputMessage"> 
    <wsdl:part name="parameters" element="GetListOfCustomersByNameResponse"/> 
  </wsdl:message> 
  <wsdl:message name="ICustomerService_InsertCustomer_InputMessage"> 
    <wsdl:part name="parameters" element="InsertCustomer"/> 
  </wsdl:message> 
  <wsdl:message name="ICustomerService_InsertCustomer_OutputMessage"> 
    <wsdl:part name="parameters" element="InsertCustomerResponse"/> 
  </wsdl:message> 
  <wsdl:message name="ICustomerService_Version_InputMessage"> 
    <wsdl:part name="parameters" element="Version"/> 
  </wsdl:message> 
  <wsdl:message name="ICustomerService_Version_OutputMessage"> 
    <wsdl:part name="parameters" element="VersionResponse"/> 
  </wsdl:message> 
  <wsdl:portType name="ICustomerService"> 
    <wsdl:operation name="GetListOfCustomersByName"> 
      <wsdl:input wsaw:Action="urn:ICustomerService/GetListOfCustomersByName"  
                message="ICustomerService_GetListOfCustomersByName_InputMessage"/> 
      <wsdl:output wsaw:Action="urn:ICustomerService/GetListOfCustomersByNameResponse"  
                message="ICustomerService_GetListOfCustomersByName_OutputMessage"/> 
    </wsdl:operation> 
    <wsdl:operation name="InsertCustomer"> 
      <wsdl:input wsaw:Action="urn:ICustomerService/InsertCustomer"  
               message="ICustomerService_InsertCustomer_InputMessage"/> 
      <wsdl:output wsaw:Action="urn:ICustomerService/InsertCustomerResponse"  
               message="ICustomerService_InsertCustomer_OutputMessage"/> 
    </wsdl:operation> 
    <wsdl:operation name="Version"> 
      <wsdl:input wsaw:Action="urn:ICustomerService/Version"   
              message="ICustomerService_Version_InputMessage"/> 
      <wsdl:output wsaw:Action="urn:ICustomerService/VersionResponse"  
              message="ICustomerService_Version_OutputMessage"/> 
    </wsdl:operation> 
  </wsdl:portType> 
</wsdl:definitions> 
Figure 3.4: WSDL 
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3.2.1.3 Universal Description, Discovery and Integration (UDDI) 
 UDDI is an OASIS standard defining a scheme to publish and discover information 
about Web Services[76]. The history behind UDDI was created by the need for public 
advertisement and location of the Web Services. This was seen as the final missing piece to 
the Web Services framework back in the March 2000. In this fashion service discovery and 
communication could be accomplished across different parties independent of their 
geographical location. IBM, Microsoft and Ariba started working on a solution together 
and formed the first version of the UDDI in September 2000[75]. 
 UDDI, as an implemented software product, offers a repository for service 
descriptions. A UDDI Web Service runs above the UDDI repository and is responsible for 
registration and discovery of the service descriptions. Even though UDDI is treated as a 
vital part of the Web Service framework, it might also be used to handle other kind of 
service descriptions than the standard Web Service description, WSDL. Therefore, all 
service descriptions published to UDDI are mapped to UDDI description definitions. 
UDDI tModel is an example of such definition. In a typical Web Service registration 
scenario, a service provider would send the WSDL to the UDDI by using the UDDI Web 
Service and the UDDI service will map the WSDL to the tModel description before storing 
it in the UDDI repository[78]. 
 
 
Figure 3.5: UDDI registry and discovery process 
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 In the world of network based services, the client is often referred to as the service 
consumer while the server is referred to as the service provider. Figure 3.5 shows how a 
service provider makes its Web Services known to the public. Firstly, the service provider 
publishes its WSDL to the UDDI registry by sending a SOAP containing a UDDI message 
to the UDDI service. Since UDDI is universal service repository it will map the WSDL to 
tModel. In addition to WSDL, other properties describing both the service and the service 
provider should be registered so the service is discoverable by organization properties like 
business type or company name. In another organization a service consumer looks up for 
this specific service to accomplish a certain task. By some criteria given by the service 
consumer UDDI is able to find a matching service so the UDDI passes the WSDL URI to 
the service consumer wrapped in a SOAP containing UDDI response message. The service 
consumer receives the SOAP message, extracts the URI of the WSDL and finds the WSDL 
on the network. By now the consumer have all necessary knowledge about the service and 
is able to establish the connection with it. 
3.2.2 RESTful Services 
 Representational State Transfer (REST) according to its creator Dr. Roy Fielding is 
a “coordinated set of architectural constraints that attempts to minimize latency and 
network communication while at the same time maximizing the independence and 
scalability of component implementations.”[79]. Indeed, REST is not a new standard nor a 
new distributed system but an architectural style for building services on the Web, fully 
exploiting the functionality of the HTTP. It does not add any new specifications but 
utilizes those already defined in the HTTP. 
 Back in 2000 REST was firstly described in Roy Fielding’s Ph.D. dissertation, the 
same man who also co-authored on the HTTP standard[85]. He acknowledged the big 
success of the Internet and believed that all the resources on the HTTP should be identified 
in one common way. Every single resource should be identified by its own unique URI so 
that it may be referenced from other resources. Actions upon the resource should be 
decided by HTTP methods and communication between a client and a server should 
always be stateless, just like the regular HTTP communication. In the HTTP world the 
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term resource is used for any type of document hosted on the Internet, like HTML, XML 
or JPEG. 
 When it comes to services based on REST architecture, popularly called RESTful 
services[3](p.5) or RESTful web services[1](p.8), the same principals apply as for the other 
resources. A RESTful service is also referred to as a resource, and a request or a response 
is just a plain HTTP exchange with the URI to that resource. The URI is used to download 
the state of the resource to the requestor, potentially change the state and uploaded it to the 
same URI[87]. The HTTP exchange may also contain a message in the HTTP body 
presented in a chosen format. Some of the typical message formats are XML, XHTML, 
JSON and RSS/Atom where XML is probably the most typical one[3](p.9-10). Since 
RESTful messages are tied to the HTTP they are not neutral regarding the transporting 
protocol like SOAP messages. In contrary to SOAP, they do make use of the HTTP 
mechanisms like caching which makes them quite scalable[3](p.2).  
 The RESTful service architecture is dependent of the HTTP methods[1](p.8), also 
referred to as  HTTP verbs[3](p.7). There are eight methods defined by the HTTP 1.1 
standard[80] but only four of them are actively used by the RESTful services. Those four 
are GET, POST, PUT, and DELETE, where GET is used to retrieve messages, POST is 
used for creation of new messages, PUT is used for both creation and modification, and 
DELETE is used to delete the data[3](p.8). These verbs are specified by the client in a 
HTTP request and in combination with the resource URI it tells the service what type of 
action is expected from it. SOAP HTTP requests on the other hand, are always specified 
with the POST method, irrelevant of the action type[3](p.9). Following two figures 
demonstrates two HTTP requests formatted accordingly to REST guidelines with the same 
URI but different HTTP methods. The first one call for data retrieval specified by an 
identifier equals 1 while the second one deletes the data with the same value.  
 
GET RestService/Customer/1 HTTP/1.1 
HOST: ana2 
Figure 3.6: HTTP request with GET 
 
DELETE RestService/Customer/1 HTTP/1.1 
HOST: ana2 
Figure 3.7: HTTP request with DELETE 
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 The messages representing objects are given in their original form. For instance, the 
Customer-element from Figure 3.3 will be serialized to XML and no additional elements 
will be added. Compared to the SOAP message in Figure 3.2, the REST version in Figure 
3.8 contains pure XML object, is smaller and easier to read by humans. Smaller message 
size and simpler processing require lower resources in term of power and hardware, hence 
making RESTful services more suitable on smaller devices then Web Services[84]. 
 
HTTP/1.1 200 OK 
Content-Length: 193 
Content-Type: text/xml; charset=utf-8 
Server: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/1.0 
Date: Fri, 01 Apr 2011 13:49:41 GMT 
 
<Customer> 
     <Id>14</Id> 
     <LastName>Normann</LastName> 
     <Name>Ola</Name> 
     <Address> 
       <Id>0</Id> 
       <PostalCode>1567</PostalCode> 
       <Street>Christian Michelsens gate 6</Street> 
       <City>OSLO</City> 
     </Address> 
</Customer> 
Figure 3.8: HTTP response with XML in the body 
 
 The REST API is heavily based on HTTP API, something all major programming 
languages support. It is not as abstracted as the Web Services API and generally requires 
little language support beyond sending and receiving the HTTP streams. Because of this, 
the REST API is very simple. Through WSDL 2.0 and WADL service definition is offered 
but these are not widely supported and are target of concerns that such functionality 
conflicts with the core flexibility of REST services[88]. Because of the description lacking 
a client needs to gain knowledge about the service in another way, like reading the 
documentation.  
 Many companies and organizations have embraced REST and offer services based 
on its principals. Many of them including Google, Microsoft[3](p.251), Yahoo and 
Amazon[1](p.49) offer different services and even technologies on top of their REST API.  
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3.3 General Security 
3.3.1 Security goals  
 One of the primary goals of any company in the world should be to protect their 
assets. Assets may be of both tangible and intangible character. Tangible can be grouped 
into buildings, computers and other equipment while intangible assets may stand for 
product and business secrets. Both product and business secrets stand for inexpressible 
values, both from the monetary perspective as well as from the competitive perspective. 
For instance in pharmaceutical industry, a chemical composition of a unique medicine may 
create such an advantage for a company that the company may overcome competition in a 
certain field thus gaining contracts, reputation and huge economic boost. Cerezyme, a 
medicine for rare Gaucher disease, cost $200000 for the average patient and annual sales 
are above $1000000000[6] because there is no real alternative. 
 The Web Services and the RESTful services are also some of the intangible assets 
that may represent the portal to valuable business processes. When company’s data are 
shared with customers through these services it becomes their responsibility to provide 
correct data in secure manner at agreed time period. Several models have been proposed to 
describe the goals of a security policy. According to Hollar & Murphy these goals can be 
divided into classic security goals and transactional security goals[5](p.53).  
3.3.1.1 Classic security goals 
 Security concerning IT and information is traditionally defined by the “CIA triad” 
or “CIA triangle” where the acronym CIA stands for confidentiality, integrity and 
availability[8](p.98). These three aspects define the heart of any secure system and most 
systems cover all of them[5](p.54). There exist conflicts between those three goals but the 
area in the center is the place where all three work together and define security. 
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Figure 3.9: CIA Triad 
 
 
Confidentiality 
 Confidentiality of information is occupied with concerns of ensuring that the 
information is read and understood by trusted, authorized parties[5](p.54). Any other party 
will be prevented from accessing the information, sometimes even to the extent of keeping 
unauthorized parties from knowing that the information exists[5](p.54). Data is often 
classified at varying levels of sensitivity making it sometimes available to all authorized 
users and other times to a smaller group of users. Confidentiality is often ensured by the 
use of cryptography.  Although privacy and confidentiality are very much related, privacy 
seeks to protect the information from being read while confidentiality covers all forms of 
access like reading, copying, printing, and so on[5](p.54). 
 
Integrity 
 Information integrity is occupied with keeping the information in correct form and 
not allow modification by parties or artefacts without control[8](p.99). The main concern 
of information integrity is to protect the information against attempts to tamper with it and 
make sure it is always correct. In a banking system we would like the system to detect if 
our information is changed by someone else while we are about to commit a payment. 
There exists a conflict between confidentiality and integrity where confidentiality is 
concerned with concealing the information while integrity doesn’t care if the information is 
read as long as it remains correct[5](p.55). 
Security 
Confidentiality 
Integrity  Availability
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Availability 
 Availability is occupied with that information can be accessed or used by 
authorized parties and artefacts when required[8](p.99). Any information that is not 
available when required is of a limited value. In the banking system example, while we are 
about to pay for a set of cheap airplane tickets and the banking transaction service is down 
due to an error, most probably those tickets will have a higher price next time the service is 
up. It is important to understand that this policy is concerning authorized requests since an 
unauthorized user with the knowledge about the resource may flood the system with 
requests so that the system would not be able to serve authorized users (DOS 
attack)[5](p.55). As with integrity, there is a conflict between confidentiality and 
availability where confidentiality tries to make the information unavailable or hidden for 
an unauthorized person while availability tries to be available at any time[5](p.55). 
 It is important to understand that security objectives between organizations vary in 
the sense that confidentiality may be top prioritized in an organization like a hospital, 
while availability may be the most prioritized goal in an organization offering products and 
services[8](p.100). 
3.3.1.2 Transaction security goals 
 Distributed transaction-based systems have additional security requirements that are 
not completely covered by the traditional CIA triad. Those systems represent a more 
complicated security scheme than standalone systems, not only considering data 
transmission over a network but also considering who and under what privileges will be 
allowed to run different components[5](p.60). These additional goals are authentication, 
scalability and non-repudiation. 
 
Authentication 
 Authentication is a security goal seeking to validate a user’s identity[5](p.57). 
There are several ways of authenticating a user on a network. A common web site 
authentication mechanism is done by username and password. In other cases a user may 
provide a unique binary value to the server and in that way the server will know who the 
user is. 
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The insecurity of network communication, client side software and various other security 
issues pushes for a more secure exchange of identity information. Protocols must be 
carefully chosen or created as well as strong cryptography is needed to ensure the true 
identity of a user[5](p.57). In cryptography, encryption is a process that enables 
transformation of human readable text to non-readable text (ciphertext) and decryption is 
the inverse operation[7]. The encrypted text can only be understood by the parties or 
artefacts sharing an appropriate digital secret key meaning that parties without the correct 
secret key will not be able to decipher the encrypted text. 
 
Scalability 
 Scalability is a transactional goal regarding system growth or adaption as demand 
increases[5](p.58). It is a goal indirectly linked to security through issues related to system 
bottlenecks and single point of failure. System bottlenecks are weaknesses that limit the 
full potential of a system[9]. The bottlenecks are often related to hardware limitations but 
they may also be related to software as well[9]. An example of a bottleneck may be a 
process that operates a huge amount of transactions. If the system is not able to handle all 
those transactions in a reasonable amount of time then the system is not working properly. 
Because of the longer processing time these bottlenecks will eventually make the 
customers unhappy and that may lead to quick fixes, which again may lead to poorer 
security.  Single point of failure is a critical part of a system which may take down the 
whole system if it fails. The term refers also to network components or systems that may 
take down the entire network in case of failure. A good example of this is a wireless 
network switch. If it fails all computers using that switch will lose internet connection. 
Domain Name Service (DNS) on the other hand, is an example of a scalable system. DNS 
replicates its data across multiple computers so in case of an unexpected failure on a one 
machine others will have the exact same data and continue to handle requests.  
 
Non-repudiation 
 Non-repudiation, sometimes written as nonrepudiation, means that a receiver can 
prove to everyone that the sender did indeed send a piece of information, that is, the sender 
can’t deny sent information[10](p.3). Non-repudiation has a goal to bind different parties 
with a contract and make them sign the contract with a signature and a timestamp. This is a 
crucial requirement of an online transaction because digital signatures together with a 
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timestamp will provide both accountability and integrity, and through these capabilities 
parties are able to identify each other and guaranty that the transaction has not been 
modified from the beginning. 
3.3.2 Cryptography 
 Cryptography is the science and an ancient art of writing secret code, first 
documented in 1900 B.C. when an Egyptian scribe used non-standard hieroglyphs in an 
inscription[55]. It has been extensively used in war times to make original messages 
unreadable by the enemies and some famous cryptographic schemes are Caesar’s cipher 
and Wehrmacht Enigma machine, used by the Romans and Nazis respectively. Keeping the 
message unreadable is an essential requirement in the world of network communication, 
especially the untrusted ones like the Internet. In this section we will have a look at 
different algorithms used to produce the ciphertext. This section is divided into three major 
subsections based on cryptographic capabilities of the specific mechanism. 
3.3.2.1 Encryption 
 Encryption is a process of obscuring plaintext, making it unreadable without some 
sort of special knowledge[7]. Plaintext or clear text is a text understandable by humans and 
for confidentiality purposes this text can be transformed to ciphertext so it becomes 
unreadable. The transformation is carried by the use of an encryption algorithm and an 
encryption key. Encryption key is a digital key expressed in byte code. On the other hand, 
decryption is the reverse process of encryption, transforming the ciphertext to plaintext by 
the use of decryption algorithm and the decryption key. The algorithm used to decrypt 
ciphertext must be the same one used in the encryption process while decryption key may 
vary depending on the class of encryption. In fact, the encryption class, either symmetric or 
asymmetric, determines what type of keys to use in encryption and decryption. Another 
important feature regarding the keys is the key size. The key size is defined as bit length 
and together with the encryption algorithm decides how strong encryption will be. Larger 
key size within the specific encryption algorithm ensures stronger encryption while smaller 
key size provides faster encryption[5](p.233). 
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 There are two types of encryption algorithms, block ciphers and stream ciphers. 
Block cipher algorithms works on one block of input data at time where block size may 
vary, usually between 64 and 512 bits. Plaintext is sent to the buffer and when the buffer 
gets full it is passed for encryption resulting in a block of data, usually of the same size as 
the input block size. Stream cipher algorithm waits for a stream of data to fill a block 
before the block is used in encryption process. If there is not enough data to fill the block 
then extra bits are used to fill the empty space[5](p.228). 
 
Symmetric encryption 
 The encryption class where the same key is used for encryption and decryption is 
called symmetric encryption. This sort of key is often referred to as symmetric key, shared 
key[5](p.230) or secret key[55]. Symmetric encryption keys are easily understandable and 
manageable since there is only one key involved in both processes. The biggest drawback 
of this encryption class is the key distribution where multiple users require a separate key 
in order to communicate to one another. For instance, when a person A wants to 
communicate with a person B they both share the same key. When A wants to exchange 
messages with C and A does not want messages to be understood by B then A and C need 
to share a new symmetric key. Following the formula n*(n-1)/2, a small environment 
consisting of 10 users will require 45 unique symmetric keys. In addition to the issue 
regarding keys distribution, all keys need to be exchanged in a secret and secure manner. 
 Some of the most common symmetric keys algorithms include DES, 3DES, AES, 
IDEA, Blowfish and Twofish[54]. DES algorithm was the most used algorithm of the ones 
mentioned but has been cracked and considered unsafe partially due to its relatively small 
key size[5](p.233). Generally symmetric keys sizes are considered relatively small, starting 
from 64 bits. AES is the US government standard and its key size range from 128 to 256 
bits[54] where the 256 variant ensures the stronger encryption. Symmetric encryption is 
usually preferred in operations where performance is a crucial requirement and for larger 
data volumes[54]. For instance, BitLocker is a disk encryption software product built-in in 
Windows, based on AES[57]. TrueCrypt i an open source variant similar to BitLocker, 
based on multiple symmetric encryption algorithms like AES, Twofish and Serpent[56]. 
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Asymmetric encryption 
 The encryption class where two separate keys are used, one for encryption and one 
for decryption, is called asymmetric encryption. The philosophy behind asymmetric 
encryption is having a single key pair identifying a party on the network. The key pair is 
defined by a public key and a private key where the public key is used for encryption while 
the private one is used for decryption. As the name reflects, the public key is intended for 
the public so that anybody can encrypt information destined for the original party. The 
private key is to be protected by the original party since it is the only key able to decrypt 
the information encrypted by the original party’s public key. In this fashion the party is 
identified by a single public key to all other parties, eliminating the need for multiple keys 
as it was the case with the symmetric keys. Additionally the distribution of the public keys 
does not have to be secretive or protected since encryption and signature validation are 
only operations public key may perform. However, asymmetric keys are much larger than 
symmetric keys, starting from 1024 bits[5](p.233). Although key size is larger, the 
asymmetric algorithms are generally weaker than their counterparts. For instance, RSA is 
one of the asymmetric encryption algorithms and together with its 1024 bits key it is still 
weaker than AES with 254 bits key[5](p.233). Another issue regarding asymmetric 
encryption is the speed. Compared to the symmetric encryption, asymmetric is up to 1000 
times slower and requires far more processing power to do both encryption and 
decryption[54]. RSA, together with Diffie-Hellman, ElGamal and Elliptic curve 
cryptography are some of the more known asymmetric algorithms today[54]. Their field of 
usage is within key exchange, typically symmetric keys, where the asymmetric encryption 
is used to encrypt the symmetric keys before being sent to the other party[55]. Another 
example of the usage is digital signatures which are used to identify a party, ensure 
integrity upon the information being exchanged and provide non-repudiation. 
3.3.2.2 Hash functions 
 Hash functions, also known as message digests and one-way encryption[55], are the 
algorithms used to create ciphertext without additional items. It is a one-way transform of 
the input which means that it should not be possible to compute the original input out of 
the output[5](p.248). Digest or hash value are the terms describing the ciphertext produced 
when working with the hash functions[54]. A particular hash function input object will 
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have same digest value every time it gets processed but if the smallest change occurs, like 
replacing one single character, the hash value will change drastically. These drastic 
changes are crucial for preventing any sort of pattern guessing of the input value and are 
sometimes characterized as the avalanche effect[54]. Some of the famous hash functions 
include MD5 and SHA. Both MD5 and SHA-1 has been proven to produce equal digests 
for two different inputs[60]. SHA-2, the successor of SHA-1, consisting of the SHA-256, 
SHA-384 and SHA-512 which are defined by their bit size, is still regarded secure[60]. The 
digests are used for integrity checks ensuring that no change has occurred on the object 
since last digest calculation. For instance, the string “hello world” ran through the SHA-
256 hash algorithm produce digest 
b94d27b9934d3e08a52e52d7da7dabfac484efe37a5380ee9088f7ace2efcde9 while “hello 
world!” produce 
7509e5bda0c762d2bac7f90d758b5b2263fa01ccbc542ab5e3df163be08e6ca9. 
3.3.2.3 Digital signatures 
 Digital signatures are not an additional mechanism to cryptography but rather the 
result of combining both asymmetric encryption and hash functions to provide 
authentication, non-repudiation and integrity on digital documents. Digital signature was a 
concept publicly described by Diffie and Hellman in their 1976 paper “New directions in 
Cryptography” suggesting that it is a computer based equivalent of physical written 
signature[21]. In contrast to ciphertext, digital signatures are created using a hash function 
and party’s private key while the signature is validated using party’s public key. Before the 
private key is used to create the signature a digest value needs to be calculated out of the 
input message using a hash function. When the digest is created it will be encrypted by the 
private key completing the digital signature. This signature will then be appended to the 
original message and the message is ready to be sent to the other party. The other party 
uses the public key to decrypt the signature and reveal the digest. At this point the 
receiving party can conclude that the message was signed by the alleged party. The reveled 
digest will be compared to a new digest recalculated out of the message using the same 
hash function. If both digests match then the receiving party can conclude that no alteration 
has occurred since the message was signed which completes the process[5](p.247). Digital 
signatures are well used mechanism implemented in many security products like Oracle 
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Security Server[59] and CoSign[58]. XML Signature[22] is a security standard that has its 
mindset built on digital signatures. 
3.3.3 Authentication services 
 According to Hollar & Murphy, “An authentication service’s primary role is to 
establish a client’s, or a server’s, identity”[5](p.198). They follow two basic patterns of 
authenticating a client; the secure channel and the secure format. A secured 
communication channel is needed when credentials are sent over the network in plaintext. 
The secure channel will encrypt all the information from the client to the server. Secure 
format, on the other hand, stores credentials in a message which gets encrypted before 
being sent to the server and thus does not require a secured communication channel. 
Another difference between authenticating services lies in the trust relationship that exists 
between the parties. The trust relationship simply means that both parties know and trust in 
each other’s identity[5](p.193). There are different types of trust relationships and those 
can roughly be split in direct, brokered and delegated trust relationships. In the case of the 
direct trust relationship, credentials are exchanged between the parties and in that manner 
parties are directly identified to one another. In the case of a brokered trust relationship a 
server verifies the client’s credentials with a third-party broker. In a delegated trust 
relationship, the client impersonates another party’s identity in order to gain access 
privileges to a resource[5](p.193). 
3.3.3.1 User Ids and passwords 
 User ID and password is one of the simplest ways to identify a party. This type of 
scheme assumes that every single party is identified by a unique ID and password 
combination. Since a party have to send its credentials as text, user ID and password 
scheme needs to be secured on the channel level. Some of the most often used mechanisms 
for securing the communication channel is a SSL/TLS protocol[5](p.199). Web servers do 
support hiding of the credentials in HTTP by creating a digest, using hash algorithms like 
MD5 or SHA-1. This type of HTTP authentication is known as HTTP Digest 
authentication[2]. 
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3.3.3.2 Kerberos 
 Kerberos is a network authentication protocol designed to provide strong 
authentication for client/server applications by using symmetric cryptography[35]. The 
protocol was originated at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in the 1980s as 
part of a project called Athena. Athena focused on offering single sign-on by integrating 
computers on the MIT campus that ran on different operating systems[38]. 
 Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) authenticates users to servers and servers 
to users. Since KDC is vouching for different parties it is also known as a trusted third 
party. KDC also maintains a list of all users, servers, their passwords and server specific 
secret keys.  
The Kerberos is implemented using four sub protocols; authentication service (AS) 
protocol, ticket-granting service (TGS) protocol, service-granting ticket (SGT) protocol 
and client-server (CS) protocol[5](p.203). 
 When a client is about to log on a system it will send a request message to a server 
running an AS. The request message will contain client’s ID, server’s ID and a timestamp. 
Then the server will respond with a ticket-granting ticket that contains client and AS 
details, timestamp, ticket lifetime and session key to the client. The client submits the 
ticket-granting ticket to the TGS to get authenticated. The TGS creates a service ticket that 
contains a session key with a timestamp. The service ticket is encrypted by a secret key 
derived from the client’s password and then sent to the client. The client receives the 
service ticket and decrypts it by generating a secret key using its own password. All the 
subsequent communication tells the KDC that the client was able to decrypt the service-
ticket and that it really is who it claimed to be[5](p.204). 
 Kerberos runs on multiple operating systems such as Linux, Unix and is the default 
authentication mechanism on Windows 2000 and later[36][37][38]. Although symmetric 
encryption is used in Kerberos, Microsoft added public key encryption in their 
implementation[5](p.205). 
3.3.3.3 X.509 Public Key Authentication 
 A digital certificate is a digital identity that uniquely identifies a person or a 
machine on the network. Digital certificates replace Ids and passwords and are issued by a 
trusted third-party certificate authority (CA). CA is responsible for ensuring authenticity of 
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issued digital certificates by signing each certificate with its own private key[18]. Popular 
CA entities are VeriSign and Thawte. The ISO X.509 standard and Public Key 
Cryptography Standards (PKCS) define a certificate type X.509 and its usage[39]. CA 
issues a new certificate together with a private and a public key, where the public key and 
the additional information are attached to the certificate. Before any business transaction 
between a client and a server starts, a mutual authentication of one another has to be in 
place. The mutual authentication process starts after both the client and the server have 
exchanged their respective certificates with each other and validated each other’s CA by 
CA’s signature. Now the client generates a transaction ID (tran Id1), attaches it to a 
message and encrypts the message with the server’s public key. The server receives the 
message and decrypts it using its own private key. The server generates its own transaction 
Id (tran Id2) and includes it in the returning message together with tran Id1. The message is 
encrypted with the client’s public key before it is sent to the client. After receiving the 
message from the server, the client decrypts the message, finds its own tran Id1 in it and 
thus understands that the server was capable of decrypting its previous message. Finally 
the client takes the tran Id 2 and includes it in a message before encrypting it and sending it 
to the server. The server receives the message, opens it and founds its tran Id2, which tells 
it that the client was able to decrypt its previous message. The server creates a session key 
which is encrypted by client’s public key and sent to the client. The session key will be 
used to encrypt all the subsequent message exchange between the client and the 
server[5](p.200). The main reason behind the usage of session keys is their efficiency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.10: X.509 authentication process[5](p.201) 
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3.4 Security in RESTful services 
HTTP offers three types of security mechanisms; HTTP Basic authentication, HTTP 
Digest authentication and HTTPS (HTTP with SSL) [2]. Since RESTful services are just 
HTTP endpoints all of the security mechanisms mentioned above do apply to them as well. 
 The first two features are used to authenticate the client offering no additional 
protection mechanisms. HTTPS is the only complete security feature used to ensure trust, 
authentication and message protection in an exchange, and is widely used in e-
commerce[11]. 
3.4.1 HTTP Basic authentication 
HTTP Basic authentication is based on username and password exchange which is 
made when a HTTP client makes a request to a HTTP server application. HTTP Basic 
authentication was first introduced as part of HTTP 1.0, defined by Internet Engineering 
Task Force (IETF)[13]. This scheme is used for authentication purposes only and provides 
no protection of the credentials sent to the server[4]. It is also the most used HTTP 
authentication mechanism[1](p.64). 
When a client is about to send a HTTP request to a RESTful service, it’s credentials 
will also be sent in that same request. Username and password will then be a part of the 
HTTP header field called ‘Authorization’[1](p.146). When the service receives the request 
it will examine the credentials and identify the client as a user, and check its permissions. 
This means that both authentication and authorization needs to be confirmed in order to 
proceed with the actual request. If one of the conditions is not met whether credentials are 
missing, invalid or not good enough to provide authorization, then the server sends a ‘401 
Unauthorized’ response code and sets HTTP header field ‘WWWAuthenticate’ with 
instructions about how to send correct credentials next time[1](p.146). Those instructions 
will tell us what type of authentication is being used on the particular service, for instance 
the following line tells us that HTTP Basic Authentication is used and the name of realm: 
 
401 Unauthorized 
WWW-Authenticate: Basic realm="My Area" 
Figure 3.11: HTTP Basic authentication response 
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The realm is typically used to identify a collection of resources on a site and can be 
of any name [1](p.238). This pattern of communication is referred to as 
challenge/response[2] since the server challenges the client with an authentication type 
when the client is about to use a resource. After the challenge, the client must answer with 
an appropriate response which must contain its credentials. Credentials exchanged between 
the client and the service are encoded as Base-64 string sent in clear text[2] [1](p.238). 
Base-64 is an encoding format for transforming binary data into text, used for instance in 
transmitting binary data over Web Services[5](p.133). Since the credentials are transmitted 
this way it makes them vulnerable to reply attacks[2].  A reply attack is a way of deceiving 
the server by recording a previously made request between a particular client and the 
server. When the copy of a successful request is recorded then an attacker is able to send 
this request again to server and succeed at mimicking another client’s identity[2]. 
3.4.2 HTTP Digest authentication 
As HTTP Basic authentication, HTTP Digest authentication is used for 
authentication purposes over HTTP. HTTP Digest authentication is designed to be more 
secure than HTTP Basic authentication in the sense that passwords are not sent over the 
network directly but a MD5 hash is used instead[2]. It is a more complex way of 
authentication and follows a communication pattern of 
request/challenge/response[1](p.239) where a HTTP client sends a request and receives a 
challenge that may look like the one in Figure 3.12. 
 
401 Unauthorized 
WWW-Authenticate: Digest realm="My Area", 
qop="auth", 
nonce="1aa176b9c0f1b6a641c399e269772777", 
opaque="16ec5ffee6132fec3ad71c77753157c6" 
Figure 3.12: HTTP Digest authentication response 
 
The challenge describes the authentication type, realm and three other pieces of 
information. One of those three pieces is a nonce which is a random string that is changed 
on every initial request[2]. After receiving the challenge, the client generates its own nonce 
and a sequence number[1](p.239). Then the client creates a single digest string out of the 
following pieces of the information: the HTTP method and path from the request, all four 
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pieces of the information from the server challenge, username and password, its own nonce 
and its sequence number[1](p.239). The digested value variable, varHa3, is calculated as 
demonstrated in Figure 3.13. 
 
varHa1 = MD5("{USERNAME}:{REALM}:{PASSWORD}") 
varHa2 = MD5("{METHOD}:{PATH}") 
varHa3 = MD5("{varHa1}:{NONCE}:{NC}:{CNONCE}:{QOP}:{varHa2}") 
Figure 3.13: HTTP Digest authenitcation, digest value calculation 
 
When the digest is calculated, the client resends the request by passing the server 
challenge information, its own nonce as well as the digested string [1](p.240). It may look 
like the following figure. 
 
GET /resource.html HTTP/1.1 
Host: www.fantasiaislanders.com 
Authorization: Digest username="John", 
realm="My Area", 
nonce="1aa176b9c0f1b6a641c399e269772777", 
uri="/default.html", 
qop=auth, 
nc=00000001, 
cnonce="4123c6512a1945abc12333112121333", 
response="1111039ff8a9fb83b4293210b22253d1", 
opaque=”16ec5ffee6132fec3ad71c77753157c6” 
Figure 3.14: HTTP Digest authenitcation request 
 
The server receives the response from the client and uses its own username and 
password stored as a MD5 hash (varHa1) and the other values in order to compute a final 
digest value (varHa3) that must match the value from the client[1](p.240). If they do not 
match then the authentication fails and the client receives ‘401 Unauthorized’ response 
once again. The HTTP Digest authentication is in many ways a better alternative to HTTP 
Basic authentication, not only because it prevents reply attacks by offering a different 
nonce on every request but also because it stores the credentials on the server into an 
irreversible hash value ensuring that both username and password stays hidden even at the 
source system. 
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3.4.3 HTTP Secure (HTTPS) 
HTTPS or HTTP with SSL/TLS is a way to secure communication between a client 
and a web server. SSL (Secure Socket Layer) and TLS (Transport Layer Security) are two 
protocols at application layer mostly utilized to protect HTTP transactions but those have 
also been used with IMAP and POP3[12]. SSL was originally developed by Netscape 
reaching version 3 already in 1996[5](p.192). TLS, developed by the IETF, is based on 
SSL version 3 and later became the successor of SSL as well. The latest version of TLS is 
1.2 and is very similar to the earlier versions of TLS and SSL version 2 and 3. There is 
even a built-in mechanism for version negotiation which makes different TLS versions and 
SSL compatible with each other[17](p.87). SSL/TLS is supporting applications exclusively 
running over TCP[12]. This security protocol offers confidentiality, authentication and 
integrity protection of the data[11][15] by creating an encrypted tunnel between two 
computers. The information is generally in the clear text at both endpoints but is protected 
by the encrypted tunnel which the information travel through[5](p.191). This type of 
security is referred to as point-to-point security since the information is secured between 
the two nodes only[14]. SSL/TLS is composed of several protocols: Record protocol, 
Handshake protocol, Change Cipher Spec Protocol and Alert Protocol. The Record 
protocol which is the lowest one, provides privacy and data integrity to higher level 
protocols[11][15]. The Handshake protocol is responsible for the authentication of both the 
client and the server, and to exchange cryptographic keys and negotiate an encryption 
algorithm between them[11][12]. The Change Cipher Spec Protocol consists of a single 
message used to indicate that the chosen keys will be used by the Record Layer[12][15]. 
The Alert Protocol is used to alert the peers about the current state like errors and closure 
of the session[12]. 
The way communication between the client and the server is done is by a client 
issuing a simple request to server’s port 443 which is the default HTTPS port. Then the 
client decides cryptography type it wants to use in order to establish a secure 
communication with the server. Secure communication in this context stands for 
authentication, encryption and data integrity[5](p.192). There are several mechanisms 
available for accomplishing authentication like RSA cryptography algorithm, Diffie-
Hellman key agreement algorithm and Fortezza[16] crypto cards[5](p.192). DES, IDEA, 
RC2 and RC4 are cryptography algorithms that might be chosen for data encryption and 
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decryption. Digest algorithms like SHA and MD5 might be chosen for data integrity 
[5](p.192). After negotiation is done the server sends its certificate to the client. The 
certificate contains information about the server and a certificate authority (CA) signature 
used to identify the CA. Once the client receives the certificate from the server, it uses 
CA’s public key to identify certificate’s signature. After that, the client generates a session 
key and encrypts it using server’s public key. Then the encrypted session key is sent to the 
server who decrypts the session key using its own private key. The server now encrypts a 
message with the session key and marks the end of the whole negotiation by sending it to 
the client[5](p.192). This shows that both client and server have agreed upon a session key 
and from now on data exchange between the client and the server will be secured. 
3.4.4 ATOM format security 
 Previously it was mentioned that the focus of this thesis is to offer protection for 
XML and JSON formatted messages since they are the most used ones and selectable by 
default in WCF. However, it should be said that according to the IETF Atom Syndication 
Format specification[20], ATOM format may be signed and encrypted using XML 
Signature and XML Encryption. Unfortunately, the only implementation we found 
supporting encryption and signature of the ATOM formatted messages is the Apache 
Abdera project[99] which is a java library. It is also important to understand that the IETF 
specification discusses how to protect a single message, unrelated to any specific transport 
protocol. 
3.5 Security in XML 
 XML got growing acceptance in the industry as the document standard and as the 
protocol. In order to meet the demand for classic and transaction security goals, a number 
of specifications and standards have emerged through the years. These standards use well-
known cryptographic and security technologies and many of them provide the basis of 
Web Services security. In this chapter we will look at how basic security requirements like 
authentication, confidentiality and integrity are met, but also present specifications 
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targeting larger implementations and solving issues regarding key management, access 
policies and single sign-on. 
3.5.1 XML Signature 
 XML Signature is a W3C recommendation[22] and is based on XML syntax. It is 
primarily used to provide digital signatures on XML but may also be used on other types of 
objects, whether they are in textual or in binary format[19](p.10). As the digital signature, 
XML Signature will ensure message integrity, authentication and non-repudiation[22]. A 
key feature offered by XML Signature is that it may provide a single signature covering 
multiple resources. These resources may be multiple XML documents, a XML document 
or its elements, or another type of an object[19]. Since the elements may be signed 
separately, the document may be signed with multiple digital signatures thus allowing 
different senders to contribute on a single document. 
 The way XML Signature works on XML documents is by extending the document 
with the additional elements where Signature-element being the root node. 
 
<?xml version=1.0” ?> 
<Signature xmlns=”http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#”> 
  <SignedInfo> 
    <SignatureMethod></SignatureMethod> 
    <SignatureValue></SignatureValue> 
    … 
  </SignedInfo> 
</Signature> 
Figure 3.15: XML Signature Element 
 
 The Signature-element sub elements describes the information about how the 
signature was generated, the actual signature, information about the key used in the process 
of generating the signature, optional objects included in creating the signature and 
additional information about the process of signing[5](p. 273). The process of creating a 
digital signature is handled in the following way. First step is to create a message digest 
out the chosen XML document, elements or the object by using a hash function such as 
SHA-1 or SHA-2[19]. Although SHA-1 is the only algorithm required to be supported, 
there are several implementations that support SHA-2 as well[19]. The second step 
completes the creation of the digital signature by encrypting the message digest using 
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sender’s private encryption key [5](p.271). Encryption algorithms like DSA or RSA might 
be chosen, or even and encryption technology like PGP[5](p.274).  After this step digital 
signature is appended to the document. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.16: Digital Signature Creation Process 
 
 The validation process of the signature on the recipient side may be seen as reverse 
of the signing process. First the recipient calculates the digest value using the exact same 
hashing algorithm as the sender did. Then the newly calculated digest value is fed into a 
verification function along with the sender’s digest value and sender’s public 
key[5](p.271). If the values don’t match then the document has been changed since the last 
time it was signed. In case of the XML, sometimes the verification process may fail even if 
the XML document has not been changed since it was signed. This might be due to the 
differences in the physical representation of the document on the sender’s and recipient’s 
side. In order to minimize the differences in their physical appearance there is an important 
feature called canonicalization. Canonicalization can be specified inside the 
CanonicalizationMethod-element which allows us to choose an algorithm that will convert 
the document into a common, standardized format before digest is calculated[5](p.273). 
This operation is important because two logically equivalent XML documents may differ 
in their physical representation where the difference may be in whitespaces, line endings or 
character encodings. For instance, ASCII text widely uses three different line ending 
sequences and every major operating system family incorporate different line ending by 
default. Line ending in Windows is defined by ‘/r/n’, Linux by ‘/n’ and the classic Mac OS 
by ‘/r’. Digital signature validation will not break if the verification digest calculations are 
performed on exactly same bits as the original signature digest is based on. The issue 
around canonicalization is well-documented in the paper “What you see is Not Always 
What You Sign” by Jøsang et al[21]. 
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<?xml version=1.0” ?> 
<car model="Think" electric="true"> 
 
<?xml version=1.0” ?> 
<car      
electric=  "true" 
             model='Think'    
> 
Figure 3.17: Two logically equivalent XML documents 
 
 XML Signature is a widely used standard and an important building block many 
other security related standards like WS-Security[19] and Security Assertion Markup 
Language (SAML)[24]. 
3.5.2 XML Encryption 
 XML Encryption is, like XML Signature, a WC3 recommendation[23] and its 
purpose is to ensure confidentiality by encrypting the data. The syntax of XML Encryption 
is based on XML. It also shares other similarities with XML Signature in the way it 
operates on the objects. For instance it allows XML documents, selected XML elements 
and non-XML resources to be encrypted[19]. The advantage of allowing certain parts of 
the XML document to be encrypted may be convenient in the case of a workflow process. 
For instance, routing-centric elements in a XML document may not be business sensitive 
like some other elements and thus does not require to be encrypted since both encryption 
and decryption are costly processes. If those elements do not become encrypted then a 
system for handling incoming documents will be able to determine document’s end system 
without decrypting it. This type of flexibility is one of the advantages of XML Encryption 
over technologies like SSL/TLS. 
When XML Encryption is implemented on a XML document it will extend it with an 
EncryptedData-element. EncryptedData-element and its sub-elements will contain all the 
information about how and what elements are encrypted. The placement of the 
EncryptedData -element on a XML document depends upon encryption requirements. If a 
whole document is to be encrypted, then EncryptedData will become the root node of the 
document. Otherwise, the element will replace selected elements only. Figure 3.18 and 
Figure 3.19 demonstrates how an element, OrderDetails, gets encrypted. 
 
Related work 
46 
 
<Order xmlns=”http://sample.uio.no/order”> 
  <Name>Ola Norman</Name> 
  <OrderDetails> 
    <Article>Learn XML in 24 hours</Article> 
    <Price>200$</Price> 
  </OrderDetails> 
</Order> 
Figure 3.18: Order-element containg OrderDetails 
 
<Order xmlns=”http://sample.uio.no/order”> 
  <Name>Ola Norman</Name> 
  <EncryptedData Type='http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Element' 
     xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#'> 
    <EncryptionMethod 
       Algorithm='http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#tripledes-cbc'/> 
       <KeyInfo xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#'> 
         <KeyName>Ola Norman</KeyName> 
       </KeyInfo> 
       <CipherData> 
         <CipherValue>oqUYdLlNNa...</CipherValue> 
       </CipherData> 
  </EncryptedData> 
</Order> 
 
Figure 3.19: OrderDetails-element encrypted by XML Encrypt  
 
 While there are several sub-elements inside EncryptedData-element there is only 
one mandatory element called CipherData which contains or provides a reference to the 
encrypted data in the cyphertext format[19]. XML Encryption supports several encryption 
algorithms like AES, Triple-DES and RSA[5](p.266) and chosen algorithm may be 
specified in the EncryptionMethod-element[19]. In some cases the algorithm may not 
specified because both the sender and the receiver have a mutual contract on the algorithm 
type[19]. In addition XML Encryption supports so-called superencryption which enables 
already encrypted elements to be encrypted multiple times in order to strengthen the 
encryption[19][5](p. 266).  
 In the world of Web Services, XML Encryption is a widely used standard, just like 
the XML Signature[5](p.265). For instance, security standards like SAML version 2.0[24] 
and XML Key Management Specification (XKMS)[26] incorporates XML Encryption. 
3.5.3 XML Key Management Specification (XKMS) 
 XKMS is WC3 recommendation providing an unified way for registration and 
distribution of public keys and digital certificates for use suitable with XML Signature and 
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XML Encryption[26]. XKMS itself builds on XML Signature and XML Encryption, and 
the specification is meant to hide key management complexity on a larger scale usage and 
provide centralized storage of the keys[19]. While both XML Signature and XML 
Encryption utilize encryption keys, an appropriate method for key management is needed 
in order to employ both standards in a scalable manner. XKMS solves this issue by 
providing two Web Services, the XML Key Information Service (X-KISS) and the XML 
Key Registration Service (X-KRSS)[25](p.61). X-KISS service defines a protocol for 
location and validation of the public keys while X-KRSS service defines a protocol for 
registering, reissuing, revoking and recovering of the keys[25](p.62). In order to illustrate a 
simple encryption operation involving XKMS let us imagine there are two people, A and 
B. When the person A want to make its public key publicly available so others may contact 
it in a confidential manner, it needs to register its key by using the X-KRSS Web Service. 
Since key pair generation may be generated by A on the client side then A needs to prove 
the possession of the private key before public key is registered[19]. Registration allows A 
to associate its public key with several attributes like name, an ID or anything that may 
help others uniquely identify A[5](335). When the person B wants to send an encrypted 
document to A it is now able to find A’s public key by using X-KISS Web Service locate 
function. X-KISS Web Service will be able to locate A’s key by its attributes defined by 
the X-KRSS service. Figure 3.20 describes the process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.20: The XKSM model[5](p.336) 
 
 The X-KISS locate function offers additional functionality, for instance it allows a 
recipient of a signed document to obtain the key used for signature if the recipient does not 
know what key was used[25](p.62). It also allows retrieval of the key by parsing X.509 v3 
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certificates[5](p.336). It is important to notice that XKMS offers no mechanisms for client 
authentication[19], meaning that everybody may ask for someone’s public key.  
XKSM may be used across multiple domains. This means that a XKMS service handling 
XKMS requests in an organization may forward same requests to another XKMS service 
in another organization[19]. 
 As the X-KRSS Web Service is designed to handle key registration one at a time 
there is an additional specification called XML Key Management Specification Bulk 
Operation (X-BULK) that allows multiple key registrations to happen through a single 
Web Service call. X-BULK build on X-KRSS and provides all the necessary protocols in 
order to support bulk type of operations, for instance ability to correlate batch requests and 
responses[5](p.337). 
3.5.4 Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 
 The Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0 is an OASIS standard 
specification approved on 15 March 2005[25](p.53). It is a framework for the exchange of 
security-related information expressed as assertions in XML syntax, between asserting 
parties, i.e. SAML authorities[19]. By having its syntax defined in XML it is also platform 
independent. Current version of the SAML is 2.0 and it is not backwards compatible with 
the previous versions[24]. The major driver behind SAML was a demand of providing 
single sign-on functionality[5](p.337), meaning provide cross domain authentication and 
authorization of parties by authenticating at one common place. 
 There exist several ways of providing single sign-on. Hollar & Murphy states the 
following, “Single sign-on has historically been an identity management problem with 
three traditional solution approaches”[5](p.337). These approaches are specified in the 
following table. 
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Table 3.3: Single sign-on approaches[5](p.337) 
Trusted Tickets: Users are authenticated by a ticket granting service. From 
then on all re-authentication is eliminated since all the 
services recognize the ticket issued by the ticket granting 
service  
Synchronized Credentials: Credentials are synchronized from one system or domain to 
other systems or domains. 
Pseudonym Services: A proxy service provides authentication information by 
maintaining a repository of credentials and credential 
mappings. 
   
 SAML will provide possibility of single sign-on functionality through assertions 
rather than the traditional cross domain mechanisms as mentioned above. The way these 
assertions works is by offering multiple attributes describing a subject. A subject could be 
a person or a computer based device, and assertions may describe subject’s email address, 
information about authentications previously performed by the subject, authorization 
details and decisions as to whether the subject is allowed to access certain 
resources[25](p.53). There are three different assertion statement types offered by SAML; 
authentication, authorization and attribute statements. An authentication statement is 
concerned with the authentication of a subject and specifies how and when a subject was 
authenticated [19]. An authorization statement is concerned with the access rules and 
specifies if a subject should be granted access to resources, alternatively if the 
authorization could not be decided [19]. An attribute statement may possess additional 
information about a subject that may be useful to a request[5](p.338). 
 A typical authentication and authorization process starts by subject requesting a set 
of assertion references from SAML services by using its credentials. A service is one of the 
three types of statements mentioned above. The services grant the assertion references after 
validating the credentials of the subject and comparing the requested permissions against 
policy. If the subject is authorized then the assertion references extend the original message 
by adding an Assertion-element, for instance, extending a SOAP request[5](p.339). That 
SOAP message then becomes a policy enforcement point (PEP), meaning a “logical entity 
or place on a server that enforces policies for admission control and policy decisions in 
response to a request from a user wanting to access a resource on a computer or network 
server”[28]. Figure 3.21 shows a SOAP message extended with the Assertion-element. In a 
SAML model PEP is responsible for enforcing actual access control decisions by calling a 
policy decision point (PDP). The job of the PDP is to decide whether or not to authorize 
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the user based on the assertions provided by the PEP[5](p.339). An assertion, in addition to 
the authentication, authorization and attribute statements, may also contain a Conditions-
element. Conditions-element is used so to place restrictions on the use of an assertion. 
Some of those restrictions may apply to the assertion validity, i.e. the assertion should be 
relied upon only once because it will change next time[19]. Another conditions may 
specify that the assertion targets a particular audience or the time period when the assertion 
is valid[27](p.21). The integrity of the assertions is provided by a signature specified in the 
Signature-element and the value of it is on XML Signature format[27](p.38). Another 
important features are single logout protocol and protocols for managing the identifiers 
used between identity providers[19](p.33). 
 
<?xml version=”1.0”> 
<soap:Envelope …> 
  <soap:Header …> 
    <soap:Security …> 
      <saml:Assertion 
        xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="2011-01-
01T09:30:00Z"    
       …> 
        <saml:Issuer>https://sample.org/SAML2</saml:Issuer> 
        <ds:Signature  xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">...</ds:Signature> 
        <saml:Subject>… </saml:Subject> 
        <saml:Conditions 
          NotBefore="2011-01-01T09:31:00Z" 
          NotOnOrAfter="2011-01-01T09:33:00Z"> 
           <saml:AudienceRestriction> 
              <saml:Audience>https://sample.com/ChosenAudience</saml:Audience> 
           </saml:AudienceRestriction> 
        </saml:Conditions> 
       <saml:AuthnStatement AuthnInstant="2011-01-01T09:30:00Z"  …> 
          <saml:AuthnContext> 
            <saml:AuthnContextClassRef> 
              urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:PasswordProtectedTransport 
            </saml:AuthnContextClassRef> 
         </saml:AuthnContext> 
       </saml:AuthnStatement> 
     </saml:Assertion> 
   </soap:Security> 
  </soap:Header> 
  <soap:Body> 
  </soap:Body> 
</soap:Envelope> 
Figure 3.21: SAML structure in a SOAP message 
 
 Today SAML is used within Web Services as part of the SOAP message-level 
security. Being a framework that is independent of a centralized authority, it has the 
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potential in organizations where centralized authority may become an issue, either 
geographically, politically or technically. 
3.5.5 eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) 
 The eXtensible Access Control Markup Language version 2.0 became an OASIS 
standard in February 2005 and is a specification for defining access control 
policies[25](p.67). The syntax used for describing the policies is in XML format making 
this specification platform independent as well. The goal of XACML is to solve issues 
with enforcing access control policies at multiple points in a distributed environment since 
altering policies at multiple points is an expensive and unreliable operation[25](p.67). 
Therefore, XACML can be used as a centralized policy store for all applications in a 
domain, including providing access control to Web Services. Other issues XACML is 
solving relates to the standardized way of making policies rather than specifying them 
differently depending on the platform and language[25](p.67). XACML is structured in a 
hierarchical manner where policy set represented by the PolicySet-element may be on the 
root node of a XML document and will contain one or several policies. A policy set may 
be unnecessary in cases where there exists only one policy and in those cases the policy, 
represented by a Policy-element, may be the root node of a document[29]. Further on, a 
policy contains one or several rules. Each rule, represented by a Rule-element, decides on 
either permitting or denying a target. A target, defined by Target-element, may be a 
subject, resource, action or environment[9](p.27). Conditions can also be a part of the rule 
enforcing comparative, arithmetical or Boolean operators applied upon subjects, resources, 
actions, and environments[9](p.28). A condition may for instance compare the role of a 
subject to a static value. In cases where there are multiple rules inside of a policy, each of 
which may evaluate to a different access control decision, a rule-combining algorithm will 
be applied and create a single decision. There are seven different algorithms to choose 
from and it is also possible to define custom algorithms[29]. The same combining 
algorithms may be applied at the policy set level deciding on a single policy. An example 
of such algorithm is the Deny Override Algorithm that will return deny if any evaluation 
returns deny or if no evaluation returns permit[29]. Figure 3.22 shows a XACML policy 
containing a rule with a condition to only allow logins from 9am to 5pm. 
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  <Policy PolicyId="SamplePolicy" 
          RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-combining-algorithm:permit-overrides"> 
     <Target> 
      <Subjects> 
        <AnySubject/> 
      </Subjects> 
      <Resources> 
        <ResourceMatch …> 
          <AttributeValue…>SampleServer</AttributeValue> 
          <ResourceAttributeDesignator…/> 
        </ResourceMatch> 
      </Resources> 
      <Actions> 
        <AnyAction/> 
      </Actions> 
    </Target> 
    <!-- Rule to see if we should allow the Subject to login --> 
    <Rule RuleId="LoginRule" Effect="Permit"> 
      <!-- Only use this Rule if the action is login --> 
      <Target> 
        <Subjects> 
          <AnySubject/> 
        </Subjects> 
        <Resources> 
          <AnyResource/> 
        </Resources> 
        <Actions> 
          <ActionMatch…> 
            <AttributeValue…>login</AttributeValue> 
            <ActionAttributeDesignator… AttributeId="ServerAction"/> 
          </ActionMatch> 
        </Actions> 
      </Target> 
      <!-- Only allow logins from 9am to 5pm --> 
      <Condition FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:and"> 
        <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:time-greater-than-or-equal" 
          <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:time-one-and-only"> 
            <EnvironmentAttributeSelector                                          
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:environment:current-time"/> 
          </Apply> 
          <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#time">09:00:00</AttributeValue> 
        </Apply> 
        <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:time-less-than-or-equal" 
          <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:time-one-and-only"> 
            <EnvironmentAttributeSelector…                                          
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:environment:current-time"/> 
          </Apply> 
          <AttributeValue…>17:00:00</AttributeValue> 
        </Apply> 
      </Condition> 
    </Rule> 
    <Rule RuleId="FinalRule" Effect="Deny"/> 
  </Policy> 
Figure 3.22: XACML policy 
 
Security in XML 
53 
 
 
 The XACML model may be combined with the SAML model so that XACML can 
provide a standardized way of access control decision making[19]. In the SAML process 
example described in the SAML section, a SOAP message became a SAML policy 
enforcement point (PEP) when assertion references were included as the part of that SOAP 
message. SAML PEP then called SAML policy decision point (PDP) in order to decide if 
the subject is authorized or not. XACML complements the process when SAML PDP 
receives a call by SAML PEP so that SAML PDP routes a decision request to XACML 
context handler. XACML context handler calls than an attribute authority, also known as 
XACML policy information point (PIP), which will collect attributes about subject, 
resources and environment and return them to the XACML context handler[5](p.341). 
When the context handler receives the attributes it will pass them on to a XACML PDP 
service asking for a decision. Then XACML PDP will query a PolicySet store where it will 
invoke the appropriate rules and policies and return an authorization decision to the context 
handler which will in turn provide those to SAML PDP and on to the SAML 
PEP[5](p.341) 
3.5.6 eXtensible Right Mark-up Language (XrML) 
 eXtensible Right Mark-up Language addresses how to express and enforce access 
control and information dissemination policies. XrML is a rights expression language 
(REL) meaning that it is a language which specifies how to describe rights, conditions and, 
in XrML case, fees for using digital contents with message integrity and entity 
authentication[25](p.72). XrML syntax is based on XML and thus is platform independent. 
Latest version of XrML is 2.0, released in November 2001. Its first version was released in 
April 2000 by Content Guard Inc, a Xerox spin-off company, but prior to that it has existed 
under the name Digital Property Rights Language (DPRL) developed by Xerox. The 
history behind DPRL goes way back in time when Digital Right Management (DRM) 
originated from the music industry with the goal of preventing illegal copying of protected 
digital music. DRM systems were controlling what a user can and cannot do with the 
digital media based on a description that traveled with the digital media. The description 
has a similar role of an access policy and with it DRM systems can determine what a user 
can do with the digital content on any device where DRM system exists. Since DRM 
Related work 
54 
 
systems could exist in different versions based on operating systems, mobile phones, 
portable players and be able to support previous versions, there was a need to standardize 
policy descriptions. The DPRL emerged in 1994 as the solution to that issue, providing a 
standardized language for describing rights, conditions, and fees[25](p.71). 
 The way XrML works is by having an issuer granting rights to a principal, to use a 
resource. A principal is a subject identified by either a secret key typically represented by 
XML Signature or by providing several credentials that are validated at the same time. A 
resource is an object which a principal manipulates through principal’s rights. Resources 
can be digital media, documents and also right expressions. Conditions may also be set and 
for instance specify how many times a media file may be played before it becomes 
unusable. A common name for a container containing issuers, principals, rights, resources 
and conditions is called license[30](p.7). Figure 3.23 shows a simple XrML license 
structure. Since all the details about a license are shown in XML and since business 
requirements may demand to hide those for unauthenticated parties, there is a possibility of 
encrypting parts or the whole license by enabling XML Encryption[30](p.22). 
 
<license xmlns="http://www.xrml.org/schema/2001/11/xrml2core" 
xmlns:sx="http://www.xrml.org/schema/2001/11/xrml2sx" 
xmlns:dsig="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" 
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" 
xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.xrml.org/schema/2001/11/xrml2cx..\schemas\xr 
ml2cx.xsd"> 
   <!-- Certify that the following key holder has the common name "Alice Richardson"--> 
  <grant> 
   <keyHolder> 
   <info> 
   <dsig:KeyValue> 
     <dsig:RSAKeyValue> 
       <dsig:Modulus>Fa7wo6NYfmvGqy4ACSWcNmuQfbejSZx 
       7aCibIgkYswUeTCrmS0h27GJrA15SS7TYZzSfaS0xR9lZdUEF0ThO4w== 
       </dsig:Modulus> 
       <dsig:Exponent>AQABAA==</dsig:Exponent> 
    </dsig:RSAKeyValue> 
   </dsig:KeyValue> 
   </info> 
  </keyHolder> 
  <possessProperty /> 
  <sx:commonName>Alice Richardson</sx:commonName> 
 </grant> 
</license> 
Figure 3.23: XrML license[30](p.11) 
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 XrML is not an official standard although a technical committee at OASIS was 
formed but was disbanded before taking any decision around standardization, probably due 
to the issues regarding patents held by ContentGuard[19]. As its predecessor DPRL, XrML 
is still used in digital media and is basis for MPEG-21 REL[5](p.380). It can also be 
included as part of SOAP messages, defining right expressions[19]. As shown in SAML 
section, SAML may also be included in SOAP messages to accomplish similar tasks and 
appears to be more widely supported by Web Service implementations than XrML[19]. 
3.6 Security in Web Services 
 Although previous section provided security standards targeting XML documents, 
this section will focus on standards and specifications written for Web Services. However, 
as Web Services technology is based on XML, many of the XML security standards are 
used within Web Services security as well. Previously we have mentioned that there has 
been added multiple specifications over the years which extend the Web Services 
framework. All these extending specifications are known as WS-* and many of them are 
specified to provide advanced security mechanisms. Although IPsec and SSL/TLS can be 
used with Web Services, WS-* security related specification are specifically made for 
message-level security and in this section there will be focus on those that are in use today. 
Figure n shows WS-* security related specifications in its early stages. WS-Security, WS-
Policy, WS-Trust, WS-SecureConversation and WS-Federation are the ones still used 
while WS-Authorization and WS-Privacy became obsolete and were replaced by other 
specifications[5](p.49). 
 
 
Figure 3.24: Web Services security standards framework [25](p.48) 
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3.6.1 Web Services Security (WS-Security or WSS) 
 WS-Security is a standard for securing a single SOAP message by enabling both 
confidentiality and integrity[19]. WS-Security was first proposed in April 2002 by 
Microsoft and IBM[40] and became the standard in June 2002[25](p.56). Confidentiality is 
enabled by XML Encryption while integrity is enabled by XML Signature. As in XML 
Encryption and XML Signature cases, we are allowed to encrypt and sign the whole 
message or selected elements[25](p.57), thus enabling different parts of the message to be 
encrypted and signed for different parties. All WS-* specifications, including WS-Security, 
are defined in XML format. When implemented on a single SOAP message, WS-Security 
will extend the SOAP-header adding a new element called Security[42]. Security-element 
will then keep references to the encrypted and signed elements in the whole SOAP 
message. WS-Security specifies an attribute that may contain a copy of the signature from 
the requested message and that copy will be a part of the response message from the 
server[42]. The response message will firstly be signed by the server and sent to the client. 
In such manner the response will be tied to the original request message, a very useful 
feature in message correlation process[19]. It is also possible to specify target party or role 
for whom the security is intended for. The actor-attribute and role-attribute describes the 
party and the role respectively. The SOAP header may contain multiple Security-elements 
but only one Security-element is permitted per party or role[5](p.257). A Timestamp-
element is also specified helping in prevention of replay attacks[19]. Figure 3.25 shows a 
simple SOAP message with WS-Security enabled. The SOAP Body-element is encrypted 
and is similar to Figure 3.19 which demonstrated XML Encryption. 
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" ?> 
<soap:Envelope xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"    
                                                            xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"> 
    <soap:Header  xmlns:wsse="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/07/secext" 
        xmlns:wsu="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/07/utility"> 
        <wsu:Timestamp> 
            <wsu:Created  wsu:Id="Id-3beeb885-16a4-4b65-b14c-0cfe6ad26800">2002-08- 
              22T00:26:15Z</wsu:Created> 
            <wsu:Expires wsu:Id="Id-10c46143-cb53-4a8e-9e83-ef374e40aa54">2002-08- 
              22T00:31:15Z</wsu:Expires> 
        </wsu:Timestamp> 
        <wsse:Security soap:mustUnderstand="1" > 
            <xenc:ReferenceList> 
                <xenc:DataReference URI="#EncryptedContent-f6f50b24-3458-41d3-aac4-390f476f2e51" /> 
            </xenc:ReferenceList> 
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            <xenc:ReferenceList> 
                <xenc:DataReference URI="#EncryptedContent-666b184a-a388-46cc-a9e3-06583b9d43b6" /> 
            </xenc:ReferenceList> 
        </wsse:Security> 
    </soap:Header> 
    <soap:Body> 
        <xenc:EncryptedData Id="EncryptedContent-f6f50b24-3458-41d3-aac4-390f476f2e51"  
            Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Content"> 
            <xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#tripledes-cbc" /> 
            <KeyInfo xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
                <KeyName>Symmetric Key</KeyName> 
            </KeyInfo> 
            <xenc:CipherData> 
                <xenc:CipherValue>InmSSXQcBV5UiT...  Y7RVZQqnPpZYMg==</xenc:CipherValue> 
            </xenc:CipherData> 
        </xenc:EncryptedData> 
    </soap:Body> 
</soap:Envelope> 
Figure 3.25: WS-Security enabled on a SOAP message[41] 
 
 In addition to message confidentiality and integrity, WS-Security specifies the third 
mechanism which is the ability to send security tokens as part of the SOAP header. 
Security tokens are used to prove one’s identity by representing a set of claims where a 
claim may be an encryption key, identity, assertion, digital signature or a set of 
attributes[25](p.57). WS-Security specifies five different token profiles; Username token 
profile, X.509 certificate token profile, Kerberos token profile, SAML token profile and 
XrML/REL token profile[19]. Furthermore, custom security profiles may be specified in 
order to support new types of security tokens[41], but that may lead to non-standardization. 
WS-Security is neutral with respect to the type of any security token and specifies a 
general mechanism for including or referencing them inside a SOAP message[25](p.57). 
When implemented in a SOAP message the security token will be a sub-element of the 
Security-element.  
3.6.1.1 Username Token Profile 
 This token profile specifies how to include username and either a password or a 
secret digest value inside a Security-element so to identify a party[19]. Username token is 
defined by a UsernameToken-element and contains Username- and Password-elements. 
Username-element will contain a username in plaintext while Password-element may 
either contain a password in plaintext (default) or a digest created by a hash algorithm. The 
profile recommends that the digest is created in a similar manner as in the HTTP Digest 
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authentication scenario which means that the output is computed using a nonce, timestamp 
and a password[5](p.257). 
3.6.1.2 X.509 Certificate Token Profile 
 X.509 certificate token profile specifies how to include X.509 certificates in the 
Security-element. BinarySecurityToken-element is an element that can contain X.509 
certificates and other binary data encoded in Base64 or hexadecimal format, since the 
XML can only be specified in a textual format[5](p.258). ValueType-attribute contains the 
information about how certificates are included or referenced into the 
BinarySecurityToken-element. A certificate may be inserted into the element, represented 
by value #X509v3, or a certificate path can be used to represent the certificate or multiple 
certificates represented by values #X509PKIPathv1 or #PKCS7. It is however 
recommended that if certificates are to be referenced then the value of #X509PKIPathv1 
should be used since it represents the ordered list of certificates[43]. The certificates may 
be used to validate the public key used for signing of the incoming message or to define 
the public key used for encryption of the message. 
3.6.1.3 Kerberos Certificate Token Profile 
 As with X.509, Kerberos tickets are also represented in binary format and must be 
stored in BinarySecurityToken-element. ValueType-attribute may only contain one value 
when a Kerberos token is used and that value is #KerberosV5_AP_REQ representing AP-
REQ messages that allows a client to authenticate to a Kerberos service[44]. Earlier 
version of WS-Security allowed ticket-granting and service-granting tickets to be 
specified[5](p.259). 
3.6.1.4 SAML Token Profile 
 SAML token profile specifies how to add SAML assertions in the Security-element. 
SAML assertions are identified with Assertion-element and this element is inserted directly 
into Security-element. An example of a SAML token inside a SOAP header has been 
demonstrated by Figure 3.21. So to establish a relation between a SAML token and a 
SOAP message, the SOAP message can be signed with a key specified within the SAML 
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assertion. As an alternative, a trusted third-party can be used to vouch for the message on 
behalf of the sender for whom assertions apply. This can be done by applying a trusted 
third-party signature on the message[19]. In the section 3.6.3 regarding the specification 
WS-Trust, we will look at an example where a third-party is used to provide SAML 
assertions to the service in order to authorize the client. 
3.6.1.5 XrML/REL Token Profile 
 The XrML/REL token profile specifies how to add ISO/IEC 21000-5 Rights 
Expressions, also known as XrML expressions, in a SOAP header[19]. As SAML 
assertions, XrML expressions are added directly under the Security-element, hence the 
license-element becomes a sub element of the Security. Licenses can also be referenced 
instead of added directly. We can use either location or a license ID for referencing the 
XrML license[45]. 
3.6.2 WS-Policy 
 A policy is generally used to place requirements and conditions upon a requestor 
before he or she can consume an artefact or a service. To be effective, policies must be 
communicated and enforced. If a policy is not written down or communicated in some 
ways it is like not having a policy at all. WS-Policy is one of the key components of the 
Web Services architecture, providing a grammar for describing policies as a set of 
expressions made up of individual assertions[5](p.130). It is used to place general 
requirements and is not only tied to security requirements. However, in order to place 
security specific requirements there is a policy specification called WS-SecurityPolicy that 
adds security specific assertions to WS-Policy for communicating security related 
constraints, like security tokens, confidentiality and integrity[47]. It is interesting to note 
that WS-Policy is a W3C recommendation since 04 September 2007[46] while WS-
SecurityPolicy became an OASIS standard on 01 July 2007[47]. WS-PolicyAttachment, a 
W3C recommendation, is the final policy specification which binds policies defined by 
WS-Policy and WS-SecurityPolicy to a policy subject through the Web Services 
Description Language (WSDL) or the Universal Description, Discovery and Integration 
(UDDI)[48]. A policy subject may be a service, a message, a provider, an endpoint or an 
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interaction that can be constrained by a Web Service provider[5](p.146). WS-Policy offers 
a flexible way of defining policy expressions where a Web Service provider may present a 
service consumer with a choice to fulfill all or parts of the policy. Different choices may be 
defined so that the client can provide information that it owns or have knowledge of, 
potentially saving client’s time and economy to gather new information. In addition, the 
policies can be specified in two forms, compact and normal form where the latest is the 
most verbose one[49]. The following two figures shows the same policy specified in both 
forms. We see that the service provider demands WS-Addressing[71] to be part of the 
SOAP message and that the following SOAP exchanges must be secured either by 
transport-level security or the message-level security. 
  
<Policy> 
  <All> 
    <wsap:UsingAddressing /> 
    <ExactlyOne> 
      <sp:TransportBinding>...</sp:TransportBinding> 
      <sp:AsymmetricBinding>...</sp:AsymmetricBinding > 
    </ExactlyOne> 
  </All> 
</Policy> 
Figure 3.26: WS-Policy and WS-SecurityPolicy in compact form[49] 
 
<Policy> 
  <ExactlyOne> 
    <All> 
       <wsap:UsingAddressing /> 
       <sp:TransportBinding>...</sp:TransportBinding> 
    </All> 
    <All> 
      <wsap:UsingAddressing /> 
      <sp:AsymmetricBinding>...</sp:AsymmetricBinding > 
    </All> 
</ExactlyOne> 
</Policy> 
Figure 3.27: WS-Policy and WS-SecurityPolicy in normal form[49] 
 
 Detailed description of the Figure 3.26 follows. WS-Policy is contained inside the 
Policy-element. All-element demands that all of policy expressions are to be fulfilled. 
Inside All-element a provider is demanding a WS-Addressing defined by wsap-namespace 
prefix and two WS-SecurityPolicy assertions requiring either transport-level security or 
message-level security, defined by TransportBinding and AsymmetricBinding-elements 
respectively.  
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Since both of the WS-SecurityPolicy assertions are inside an ExactlyOne-element, the 
client can choose between one of them. Figure 3.27 contains the same elements as Figure 
3.26, only specified in normal form. In the section about WSDL it was mentioned that the 
WSDL is optional as well as the UDDI is. Since policy requirements are a part of the 
WSDL or UDDI, service providers have the option of not showing WSDL and UDDI but 
instead convey requirements through word-of-mouth or documentation to the service 
consumers, thus hiding the descriptions from the public. The possibility of not providing 
this description is in itself security percussion where unknown users will never know how 
to establish connection with the business service or if it even exists. 
3.6.3 WS-Trust 
 WS-Trust is an extension of WS-Security providing methods for requesting, 
issuing, renewing, cancelling and validating security tokens[19][33]. In addition it defines 
ways to establish the presence and broker trust relationship[33]. It became an OASIS 
standard on March 2007[32] and its latest version is 1.4[33]. The central part of this 
standard is security token service (STS) which is a Web Service providing a client with 
methods that issues, renews, cancels or validates different types of tokens[19]. STS may 
also be seen as the authentication broker providing a common access control infrastructure 
and is responsible for negotiating trust between a client and a Web Service. 
 In a typical WS-Trust scenario the only communication to STS is done by the 
client, so it becomes client’s responsibility to retrieve the correct security token from the 
STS and send it to the business Web Service.  In order to speak to STS Web Service, the 
client must add an extra element called RequestSecurityToken (RTS) in its SOAP 
request[5](p.325). RTS-element will contain all the information that STS needs to 
understand, like issue a new Kerberos token. When a token is ready to be delivered back to 
the client, STS creates a SOAP response and extends it with a 
RequestSecurityTokenResponse (RSTR). RSTR-element either hosts or provides a 
reference to the token element[5](p.326), and may also provide a session key so that all 
subsequent communication between the client and the service is encrypted using this key. 
The session key is temporary key and lasts as long as the session between the two parties is 
active. 
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Figure 3.28: WS-Trust process 
 
 STS is clearly useful in situation when there is no direct trust between a service and 
its consumer but both of them trust STS in some way. The reason why the trust between 
STS and other parties does not have to be total is because some tokens, like X.509 
certificate tokens, may prove its trustworthiness by the certificate authority that issued it. 
WS-Policy and WS-SecurityPolicy are policy specifications used by the business service 
and STS that tells the client what type of security mechanisms are needed in order to 
establish the communication with both of them[19]. 
 The way it all works together is well-described by the scenario presented in the 
video by a Microsoft architect, Vittorio Bertocci[34]. Imagine that a client wants to buy 
wine on the internet by calling wine Web Service. Before proceeding with the transaction, 
the wine Web Service demands that the client provides its age verified by a trusted 
authority, specifically Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency. Further on, the wine Web 
Service requires a SAML token that will contain the client’s age and the token must be 
signed by the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency. Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency 
acts as a STS since it will vouch for client’s identity by presenting it with a required token. 
In order for all this to take place, different parties need to store public keys of each other so 
they all know who they are communicating with by validating each other’s signatures. 
Although public keys could be distributed by a XKMS service, we make an assumption 
that the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency, the wine service and the client have each 
other’s public keys stored locally, for simplicity sake. The first step (Step 1) is for the 
client to obtain the WS-Policy of the wine Web Service so it knows what type of security 
token the wine service requires. The client finds out that the SAML token is required and it 
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must be signed by the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (Step 2). Now the client 
prepares a RST message in which it requests a SAML token representing the age assertion. 
Before RST is sent to Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (STS), the RST message gets 
encrypted by the STS public key and signed by clients own private key (Step 3). When the 
STS receives the RST it verifies the client by its signature and issues the desired SAML 
token containing age equals to 22 years. The message that gets sent back to the client is of 
type RSTR (Step 4) and will contain both the SAML token and a proof token. In addition 
to the assertion, SAML token will also contain a session key and the whole SAML token 
will be encrypted and signed for the wine service so the client won’t be able to read the 
SAML details. Proof token will contain the same session key that SAML token got but the 
proof token will be encrypted and signed for the client. The client receives the RSTR and 
now possesses the session key that will be used for all subsequent communication with the 
wine service. The client also possesses the SAML token which is going to be inserted into 
the order request SOAP message. The SOAP message will be encrypted and signed for the 
wine service and shipped to it (Step 5). The wine service verifies that the order comes from 
the client and verifies that the SAML token comes from the Driver and Vehicle Licensing 
Agency. Now the wine service opens the SAML token, reads that the client is 22 years old 
and is in possession of the session key as well. From now on all SOAP message exchange 
between the client and the wine service are encrypted by the session key they both possess 
(Step 6). The whole WS-Trust scenario is presented by Figure 3.29. 
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Figure 3.29: Wine service with WS-Trust 
3.6.4 WS-Federation 
 Through the history of information management there have been several proposals 
and approaches to identity management models. Today, those models are divided into three 
categories; distinguished isolated, centralized and distributed federated management 
model[25](p.81). The isolated model is the oldest approach and specifies that each service 
provider has its own identity provider meaning that a subject needs to provide separate 
credentials per service provider. The centralize model specifies a single identity provider 
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managing multiple service providers and their identities providers. The weakness of this 
approach is issues regarding performance and availability since this model opens up for 
potential bottlenecks and single point of failure. The distributed federated management 
model defines a federation of identity providers where every identity provider manages 
identities within its own domain and vouches for those identities to another identity 
provider. This scenario enables co-existence of multiple security technologies and 
eliminates any technology changes for new members of the federation. The only 
requirement for a new identity provider is to establish trust with the existing members of 
the federation and provide a potential conversion between its own security technology used 
for authentication and authorization and the other security technologies used by other 
members[25](p.81). An important benefit of the federated identity management system is 
that it facilitates single sign-on. 
 WS-Federation falls into distributed federated management group. It is one of the 
newest OASIS standards reaching this status on 29 May 2009[51]. This standard builds on 
other standards like WS-Security, WS-SecurityPolicy, WS-Policy, WS-Trust, and provides 
federated identity architecture for Web Services architecture[50].  
 The start of a WS-Federation identity process is based on WS-Trust. Before a client 
use a service in another domain it needs to ask for the security token from its own identity 
provider. Identity provider is just a STS with additional extensions[25](p.87). The identity 
provider in the client’s domain is a trusted third party for the client and the service and is 
responsible to provide any token type necessary to the client. In order to switch client’s 
domain token to the security token required by the service, a pseudonym service is needed. 
The pseudonym service provides the mechanism for saving and obtaining alternate 
information about an identity, and offers identity or token change in a cross-domain 
scenario, for instance changing a X.509 certificate to a Kerberos token[5](p.333). In 
addition to identity provider and pseudonym service, WS-Federation defines attribute 
service and validation service[31]. Attribute service is responsible for saving information 
about an identity, for instance attribute information from a X.509 certificate. An UDDI 
service may become an attribute service[5](p.333) offering information about services, 
businesses, etc. Validation services is another feature of WS-Federation were special Web 
Services are used for validation of tokens with the purpose of determining the level of 
trust[5](p.331). 
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3.6.5  WS-SecureConversation 
 While WS-Security is used to ensure confidentiality and integrity of a single SOAP 
message its model becomes too costly when there is a need for multiple request/responses 
exchanges between a client and the server. WS-SecureConversation introduces the notion 
of security context token composed of a shared secret between the two parties, used to 
enforce both the confidentiality and the integrity upon multiple message exchanges in a 
given session period[52]. 
 WS-SecureConversation became an OASIS standard on 01 March 2007[52] and 
builds on WS-Security and WS-Trust to provide functionality for establishing and 
identifying a security context[19]. The security context token needs to be created and 
exchanged between the parties before a session-like SOAP message exchange may begin. 
There are three ways to obtain and distribute security context tokens among parties and all 
three utilize WS-Trust[19]. The first way of token distribution is handled by a party 
creating the token by itself and sending it to the other party. The second way is by 
requesting the token from STS which will then distribute the token to both parties. The 
third way describes how parties may negotiate a security context token by using WS-
Trust’s four step negotiation protocol[5](p.334). 
 Full key exchange and authentication is only required when establishing security 
context token. After this phase every message is encrypted or signed with the information 
inside of the security context token. The secret which is a part of the security context token 
may be used to encrypt and sign the messages but the standard recommends the use of 
derived keys created from the secret context token. There can also be created several 
derived keys depending on the requirements. For instance, we may use one key to sign and 
other to encrypt the SOAP message[52]. Since all SOAP messages belonging to the same 
message exchange will reference the same security context token, there will be achieved 
increase in the overall performance[25](p.59). 
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3.7 REST alternative security efforts 
It was already mentioned that there is no solution for message-level security for 
RESTful services but there exist some community supported efforts that address RESTful 
security which we feel should be mentioned. Since one of the efforts is based on WS-* 
security specification, it is appropriate to describe it now, after Web Services security 
introduction. The first effort is a thesis written by Dan R. Olsen at Brigham Young 
University[108]. The thesis discusses how elements from WS-Security specification can be 
included in the HTTP header. This is demonstrated by two different examples where the 
first shows how a URI can be signed and how that URI signature can be stored in the 
header as WS-Security-element. Another example shows UsernameToken-element of WS-
Security stored in header as well. This means that the thesis does not address protection of 
the message in the HTTP body at all. Even though it is possible to use certain WS-* 
specifications to enable security functionality mentioned in Dan’s thesis, we do not feel it 
is a right way to go since big and complex XML structures will be stored in the HTTP 
Header and decrease readability. 
The second effort is an article written by Dan Forsberg who at that time was a 
researcher at Nokia Research Center[109]. The article deliberates about encryption of all 
kinds of HTTP content like pictures, files, etc. The same author has a strong focus on 
HTTP caching and discusses a way for providing decryption keys over TLS sessions. 
Although an interested article, there is no emphasis on signatures or partial encryption of 
the content. Since this was the most promising article we found on the Internet even if it 
did not address all of our requirements, we decided to find out more about it. We tried to 
search for a more descriptive paper or sample code but we were unsuccessful in finding it. 
At last, we decided to approached the author by mail and ask for more details. Dan was 
very responsive and told us that there is no sample code. We also got an impression that 
the article was never preceded by any other material since we could not find anything 
related to it on the Internet. 
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3.8 Summary 
RESTful services and Web Services offer advanced mechanisms to ensure secure 
message exchange between multiple parties. While REST utilize traditional HTTP security 
mechanisms like SSL/TLS thus limiting itself to transport-level security, Web Services 
may be secured using both transport-level and message-level security. Message-level 
security is achieved by WS-Security, WS-Policy and WS-SecureConversation 
specifications which are based on well-known XML standards, like XML Signature and 
XML Encryption. WS-Security also supports different authentication tokens, a useful 
option that lets service providers standardize on their existing security infrastructure. 
Through other WS-* specification Web Services offer additional security schemes used to 
define advanced policies, negotiate trust through third-parties and accomplish single sign-
on.  
 Although Web Services seem to be superior in their security repertoire, they have 
been labeled for being complex for both service consumers and providers[25](p.74). 
Industry is also struggling to implement WS-* security related specifications fully and in a 
standardized manner which has resulted in WS-I, an industry consortium aiming to provide 
guidelines for different specification implementers so that interoperability across separate 
platforms is achieved[25](p.76). We ended this chapter by highlighting some work done by 
the community although none of them fulfilled our requirements or were implemented. 
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4 Design 
4.1  Intro 
 According to our research goals we reached our first objective which was studying 
a similar distributed technology and investigating mechanisms related to its message-level 
security. That was done in the chapter 3. This chapter is about the design of the complete 
solution, both from the coding perspective and the perspective of deciding on 
authentication mechanism, cryptography tokens and their distribution. Before the design is 
discussed we will present results from the WCF proof of concept where we give a short 
explanation of the framework, description of how RESTful messages are generated and 
demonstrate some unexpected behavior related to SOAP message-level security in WCF. 
The chapter will then, based on the requirements and WCF knowledge, continue with the 
discussion of the design where we challenge ourselves and argue for the optimal solution. 
4.2 WCF proof of concept 
 Even though it may seem a bit odd to run proof of concept before designing the 
solution, it showed to be of significant use and great importance regarding the design. 
Since the developer of our solution is not very familiar with the WCF and its REST API, 
we felt the need to accumulate more knowledge before starting on the design. WCF is one 
of the most used frameworks and APIs for developing RESTful services. It is an acronym 
for Windows Communication Foundation and is a universal framework for building 
distributed services on the .NET platform and Microsoft operating systems [82](p.1). The 
WCF supports exposing .NET objects as Web Services, RESTful services, MSMQ, P2P 
based services and many others[82](p.1). A .NET object is exposed in chosen distributed 
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technology mostly by configuration which does not demand deep knowledge of any 
distributed technology. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: WCF framework overview[106] 
 
 Through the proof of concept we learned how to develop Web Services and 
RESTful services, and we also studied how security mechanisms related to Web Services 
were enabled. The latter part was of big use, especially the way Web Services enable full 
and partial encryption and digital signatures in their messages. Figure 4.2 shows a class 
which will be serialized to SOAP XML and in which the Salary-member is marked for 
encryption and signature while the Name-member is marked for signature only.  
 
using System.Net.Security; 
 
[MessageContract] 
public class Employee 
{ 
   [MessageBodyMember(ProtectionLevel=ProtectionLevel.Sign)] 
   public string Name; 
   [MessageBodyMember(ProtectionLevel=ProtectionLevel.EncryptAndSign)] 
   public int Salary; 
 
} 
Figure 4.2: Partial SOAP message-level protection in WCF 
 
 Any class marked with MessageContract-attribute will be serialized to SOAP 
message. We can also serialize members by setting a MessageBodyMember-attribute over 
any member we wish to expose. ProtectionLevel is an enumeration that might be a part of 
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a type or any of its members, giving service provider a possibility to choose different 
protection levels per different scenarios. Unfortunately, we never succeeded to partially 
encrypt or sign a message by following a procedure found on the Microsoft Developer 
Network[90], which is a site for the .NET developers. Because of this we started to look for 
a solution on the internet. According to a post posted by an experienced security developer 
on a forum in which we also participated [89], it is not possible to have different protection 
levels for each body element even though it is syntactically allowed to set different 
ProtectionLevel-enumeration on them. Nevertheless, we found the idea behind this 
solution to be a very elegant one and a good candidate for our solution. 
 Another important discovery relates to the REST API of the WCF. Early in the 
beginning of the WCF proof of concept we wanted to explore how WCF auto-serialization 
works and localize messages just when the serialization process ends. We discovered that 
while the framework seems very user-friendly when offering standard functionality, it also 
hides majority of its complexity deep inside its code and demands serious work when a 
developer tries to accomplish a bit more advanced functionality. When we finally localized 
the code where we could study the structure of serialized messages, we discovered that 
WCF always serialize .NET types to XML, even in cases where JSON is chosen as the 
message format. This particular discovery was proven to be crucial regarding cryptography 
mechanisms for our solution. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: WCF JSON serialization steps 
4.3 Design ideas 
 The lessons learned from the Web Services are that they offer multiple security 
mechanisms and support many security scenarios. Yet, these mechanisms have made Web 
Services even more complex and difficult to manage. But in every technology there are 
some positive and some negative characteristics and in this section we will concentrate on 
.NET 
type 
XML JSON 
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some security components used in SOAP messages and argue for their usage with the 
RESTful services. 
 While Web Services offer solution to advanced security scenarios, our scope is 
directed toward securing messages by introducing confidentiality and integrity provided by 
encryption and digital signatures respectively. In section 3.6.1 we saw this being 
implemented in Web Services using WS-Security specification. WS-Security specification 
ultimately extended the SOAP message with the additional security related elements that 
made SOAP messages larger, but it also made them transport neutral since all the security 
information like security tokens, encryption algorithm and digital signature were defined in 
the message itself and were not a part of its transporting protocol. WS-Security is also very 
flexible, allowing service providers to choose between several identity tokens, encryption 
algorithms and hash functions. Finally, WS-Security enables partial message encryption 
and partial signature which are crucial requirements for our solution. However, it is 
important to remember that WS-Security does not specify its own encryption and digital 
signature mechanisms but instead delegates that responsibility to the XML Encryption and 
XML Signature. 
 Contrary to the Web Services, RESTful services are highly dependent of HTTP and 
their messages cannot be transported neutral. Their architecture is light and their messages 
are simple. To keep both the architecture and the messages light and simple, the 
cryptography mechanism that we want to implement should not change those basic 
characteristics.  
4.3.1 Locate implementation 
 In the first stage of our design process it is important to decide where to enable 
cryptography in order to support message-level security. In our case, message-level 
security can either be enabled on the .NET objects or their serialized representations (XML 
or JSON). This decision, as we will soon realize, will highly impact design and 
implementation timeframe. 
 Our first option is to secure .NET objects before they become serialized. While this 
seems feasible, there are several serious issues that prevent us from carrying out this sort of 
solution. The first issue is about interoperability. If a .NET object is fully encrypted, 
Design ideas 
73 
 
 
encoded and then serialized to XML or JSON, it will not be understood by another 
platform on the other side when it gets decrypted, simply because .NET objects can only 
be interpreted by a .NET environment. The second issue is about partial encryption which 
is practically impossible to implement on the objects because types, like an integer, cannot 
keep the ciphertext value. 
 Our second option is to secure serialized representation. By studying both formats, 
one would assume that in order to support XML and JSON two separate implementations 
should exist, because enabling partial encryption on both would be different due to their 
semantic structure. Creating and maintaining two implementations is very time consuming 
and offer several challenges. One of the great challenges is related to the partial 
cryptography and being able to navigate to the selected members in order to secure them. 
However, navigating a JSON message is not possible with the built-in classes. For 
instance, navigating to a member Window of a type House is not possible without creating 
a custom JSON navigator. Fortunately, based on our newly acquired knowledge presented 
in WCF proof of concept, we discovered that the WCF stores JSON temporarily as XML 
so we may secure the temporary XML before it becomes serialized to JSON. This 
approach will also work with the partial encryption and signature. If we enable 
cryptography at the XML level then the same logic can be implemented to secure regular 
XML formatted messages. In this fashion only one logic will exist for implementing 
encryption, decryption, digital signatures and validation, thus making it more maintainable 
and shortening our development time drastically. 
4.3.2 Authentication 
 At message-level security, party identification is the initial step. Every party has to 
provide some sort of a unique and valid identification in order to proceed with the rest of 
the security process. Related to our case study, customer registry RESTful service may 
reuse well-known authentication mechanisms provided by HTTP or implement support to 
relatively new authentication delegation mechanisms like OpenID[95] and OAuth[83]. 
However, the HTTP mechanisms rely on the HTTP server configuration while OpenID and 
OAuth are dependent on third-party libraries and because of that we decided to apply one 
of the HTTP mechanisms. Since the HTTP Digest authentication seems to be a better 
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option than the HTTP Basic authentication, we choose the HTTP Digest as the 
authentication mechanism for our solution. 
4.3.3 Cryptography token 
  Although a token may be used for authentication and cryptography, we decided to 
reuse the existing HTTP authentication mechanism as stated in the previous section. In the 
case of cryptography there should be chosen a token that is widely used. A widespread 
cryptography token in the corporate world is the digital certificate based on X.509. CA’s 
are responsible for binding the keys to the certificate which is also used as the party 
identification on the internet. In addition, the fact that the CA vouches for someone’s 
certificate solves the issue regarding the trust of the certificates exchanged. Nevertheless, 
digital certificates provided by the CAs are expensive are probably not affordable by many. 
For instance, per May 2011, VeriSign offered digital certificates from $399 up to $1499, 
for one year validity[91]. There are also free tools that can create digital certificates and 
one of the famous ones is Open SSL[102]. The certificate that is created by the Open SSL 
is self-signed and its validity period can be set to a desired date. 
4.3.4 Certificate distribution 
 An important part of the PKI is certificate distribution. After the study related to the 
XKMS in section 3.5.3, there were concerns of how to implement something of these 
proportions to RESTful services. In our opinion certificate distribution is such a complex 
process as well as a solution, that it will jeopardize the simplicity of the RESTful services. 
What we consider to be more appropriate for our solution, primarily from the perspective 
of the complexity but also based on the limited development resources, is a non-technical, 
social resolution. The resolution will be particularly useful when the certificate is self-
signed and its origin cannot be vouched for. Our idea is based on certificate distribution 
fulfilled by mail exchange while being on a phone with a targeted party. The phone is used 
to ensure that the correct party is contacted but it is also used as a starting point of the 
transaction. When the targeted party answers the call, a short time window is created until 
certificates are exchanged through the mail. Due to the limited time, both parties can trust 
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the incoming mail to contain the original certificate and not to be a fraud mail sent by 
someone else. Even if our idea may be original, phones, especially mobile phones, are 
sometimes used to verify already provided information or as an accompanying token. This 
is particularly common in an authentication process. For instance, Citrix, a well-known 
virtualization system, automatically sends each client a session password by SMS which 
the client has to provide together with its credentials in order to be successfully 
authenticated[103]. This type of authentication approach is referred to as two-factor 
authentication[103].  
 To describe our idea of the certificate exchange let us think of two parties, A and B. 
Party A contacts party B by the phone and asks B to send its certificate by mail. B sends its 
certificate to A and vice versa while they both are on the phone line. Since A and B are on 
the phone simultaneously they are able to establish a trusted relationship and follow the 
progress of the exchange. When certificates are exchanged both parties will be aware of it 
and the communication may end. It is a very light solution but we acknowledge that it can 
also be very unpractical on a larger scale. 
 
Step 1: A contacts B per phone
A B
Step 2: B answers the call. Connection established
Step 3: Exchange certificates per mail
Step 4: Communication ends when certificates are exchanged
 
Figure 4.4: Certification distribution process 
4.3.5 Cryptography mechanism 
 In our case, in order to implement a PKI based solution, we should use a 
standardized end-to-end security mechanism and not handle necessary cryptography steps 
separately. To be more precise, in a PKI solution when enabling cryptography such as 
encryption, there are multiple steps that have to be taken. 
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1. Generate a session key 
2. Use the session key to encrypt a message 
3. Use the public key to encrypt the session key 
4. Provide the encrypted message together with the encrypted session key to the other 
party so it can decrypt the message 
 
 By using a standardized cross-platform cryptography mechanism we encourage 
interoperability. There are several security mechanisms that fulfill PKI goals and our 
requirement of being a cross-platform. Some of the most famous ones are Pretty Good 
Privacy (PGP), Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and XML Signature and XML 
Encryption. 
 PGP is a security mechanism mainly used to encrypt and sign e-mails and files 
[93](p.3). It is a well-used and relatively light-weight security mechanism that has been 
used for two decades[93](p.10). In addition, PGP supports both public keys and digital 
certificates. Unfortunately, there are no .NET built-in classes supporting the PGP 
cryptography but there are several .NET open source libraries, such as Bounty Castle[92], 
offering this kind of cryptography. By implementing an external library we would breach 
our principle of not using any external APIs so the PGP will not be considered for our 
solution. 
 Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) is a specification that may be used to sign 
and encrypt any digital content[94]. It is well-supported in .NET and many other platforms 
and it supports a variety of encryption and hashing algorithms. The down side of this 
specification, in regard to our requirements, is that the partial signing and encryption are 
not supported by default meaning that the selected message parts must be extracted, 
signed, encrypted and then added back to the original message replacing the clear text. The 
receiving party is then responsible to extract the ciphertext, decrypt, validate and replace 
the ciphertext with the clear text. Another down side is the issues regarding backward-
compatibility between newer and older versions[94]. 
 XML Encryption and XML Signature can also be used to achieve our goals. Both 
specifications are a fundamental part of Web Services and XML security specifications and 
because of that, probably less prone to cardinal changes which could make them less 
backward-compatible in the future. Although not a formal requirement, less changes and 
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backward-compatibility are important characteristics when building applications that 
should last for longer periods. The main reason why those two specifications seem to be 
better alternatives are  because both are made primarily for the XML documents and are 
well-supported on multiple platforms. In addition, partial signing and encryption is 
possible without introducing custom code. Therefore, we conclude that the most suitable 
cryptography mechanism for our solution is the combination of XML Encryption and 
XML Signature. 
4.3.6 Message size and readability 
 By standardizing cryptography on XML Encryption and XML Signature we are 
ensured to be using optimal mechanisms for securing XML. But every choice comes with a 
price and in this case the price is readability. From the simple examples showed in sections 
3.5.1 and 3.5.2 we have seen that both standards produce a lot of information when they 
are enabled upon a XML document. All this information is important for both security 
standards and cannot be removed from the XML. In addition, a lot of the information 
produced by both security mechanisms is repeated throughout the document. For instance, 
if we take a closer look to the information produced by XML Encryption we will notice 
that a lot of it is repeating. This may be seen in Figure 4.6 which shows a XML message 
containing customer data related to our case study. 
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<ArrayOfSerCustomer xmlns:i="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"> 
  <SerCustomer> 
    <Id>14</Id> 
    <LastName>Normann</LastName> 
    <Navn>Ola</Navn> 
    <SerAddress> 
      <City>OSLO</City> 
      <PostalCode>1567</PostalCode> 
      <Street>Christian Michelsens gate 16</Street> 
    </SerAddress> 
  </SerCustomer> 
  <SerCustomer> 
    <Id>15</Id> 
    <LastName>Olsen</LastName> 
    <Navn>Kari</Navn> 
    <SerAddress> 
      <City>OSLO</City> 
      <PostalCode>1567</PostalCode> 
      <Street>Christian Michelsens gate 16</Street> 
    </SerAddress> 
  </SerCustomer> 
</ArrayOfSerCustomer> 
Figure 4.5: XML message containing two customers 
  
<ArrayOfSerCustomer xmlns:i="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"> 
  <!--################################--> 
  <!-- CUSTOMER with last name Normann  --> 
  <!--################################--> 
  <SerCustomer> 
    <Id>14</Id> 
    <LastName>Normann</LastName> 
    <Name> 
      <EncryptedData Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Element" 
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"> 
        <EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes256-cbc"/> 
        <KeyInfo xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
          <EncryptedKey xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"> 
            <EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-1_5"/> 
            <KeyInfo xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
              <X509Data>           
<X509Certificate>MIIDzTCCArmgAwIBAgIQ9le+j1LyAoJJDZTI7QaWhzAJBgUrDgMCHQUAMFsxCz
AJBgNVBAYTAk5PMQ0wCwYDVQQHEwRPc2xvMREwDwYDVQQLEwhPcmcgVW5pdDEVMBMG
A1UEChMMT3JnYW5pemF0aW9uMRMwEQYDVQQDEwpNeSBSb290IENBMB4XDTEwMTAxMTE3
Mzk1NloXDTE4MTAxMTE3Mzk1NVowWzELMAkGA1UEBhMCTk8xDTALBgNVBAcTBE9zbG8xET
APBgNVBAsTCE9yZyBVbml0MRUwEwYDVQQKEwxPcmdhbml6YXRpb24xEzARBgNVBAMTCk15I
FJvb3QgQ0EwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCqcVtqOLwn4JinDKMHu16
2/bxstk6I1ObSp/FLxuatquJuNJncqxNfqzGzeBg/VURRw8RMDa5laWLV6KjbX2VpHg8A4m1MsXX83zU
516RkHWzMlrr6wlnbN72VrioIDf24fwhnCtjfOJ1CsEJuxTkDFvtSFUevsbGq5J0taJrPI4eIMehrEEtnAcoX8
7GNRj3FLUSEuyTGX2pwHHkF01cSuSjl08UX1E3JwBDt1WyHFB4fHG51soczIIG9aS/vYAlIp7LNKhmE
yCv2zd+dQgS645NaFrFL7yM9LPMXA2TCJVDejh2FRwkXSDtIvojZt1fxk+Q52+5zRi7mlGzVFtf1AgMB
AAGjgZQwgZEwgY4GA1UdAQSBhjCBg4AQFGRX3nk6+CwkKk6pTLjB9qFdMFsxCzAJBgNVBAYTA
k5PMQ0wCwYDVQQHEwRPc2xvMREwDwYDVQQLEwhPcmcgVW5pdDEVMBMGA1UEChMMT3Jn
YW5pemF0aW9uMRMwEQYDVQQDEwpNeSBSb290IENBghD2V76PUvICgkkNlMjtBpaHMAkGBSsO
AwIdBQADggEBAEcjZF70sBpy3gPVv/GYeggs1pURuXxefPODLgZBT74vY0TGJvicGWTfgCjj+Tx/zXT
zW8zM6fTFLYIoYA4ZryRM11aiYfdHwJfd6dAgoSIBwEMEZspJYZ7B4g7KuQEweeJticOXOK4aK6pqT
oxMWvpLwUcBGXQfMp6Uz2zYjQw8n5XFYpe3kIiEDDH/9XRMGIteuYBAo/DvMjhbhsv9MUotK3v1oq
6tIXTjoDeDmmx6j45ZO8cRQ2wfbpjDXlJXmDkQDQD2J39dytmX+fBxDg5QHCmg62Y+rvjRoqVsth/Asi
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vN16BQ0mhhvI06Zh0ORE2GQUso5ohoqdQJXDNDyVg=</X509Certificate> 
              </X509Data> 
            </KeyInfo> 
            <CipherData>              
<CipherValue>Lfc4eGugyFAifvm1KnppO1kaMcDbgL0Av5nJsIjHK8CbsN5ySfmm7Ipu9tRLUBXTb63+Z
Zq5FrvCfsmhR+SGSted1QjX1ajZ4RgPk26bN1Xuuld9QRUK/O2o0h+Zk590GFR5R3KZ9Be2zMocSW5J
m+TQH4Vtei/lJgYHaRChW+aHekZlV2RASU4FBdsBxQKq5j9QSltl0GbUy0zSfB1IvQn6vbumOfC8oVE+
/XyTH0+1x7zA2XwjWgzYz17fCKUV1WJQgsc4jD+Ct1mqC5b67I+80FPx77lW9lz0Sj7ILBTTNJ+7uIGoG
8meSuQQUboi50KMKaNPYii7QgC5NQhO9A==</CipherValue> 
            </CipherData> 
          </EncryptedKey> 
        </KeyInfo> 
        <CipherData> 
          
<CipherValue>J62XtOHX7f0An8DckXbDNYdAoADTdGq01FclGcjEwHfx2aoPu2zIBrvOKpEO2Oz/</Cip
herValue> 
        </CipherData> 
      </EncryptedData> 
    </Name> 
    <SerAddress> 
      <EncryptedData Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Element" 
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"> 
        <EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes256-cbc"/> 
        <KeyInfo xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
          <EncryptedKey xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"> 
            <EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-1_5"/> 
            <KeyInfo xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
              <X509Data>        
<X509Certificate>MIIDzTCCArmgAwIBAgIQ9le+j1LyAoJJDZTI7QaWhzAJBgUrDgMCHQUAMFsxCz
AJBgNVBAYTAk5PMQ0wCwYDVQQHEwRPc2xvMREwDwYDVQQLEwhPcmcgVW5pdDEVMBMG
A1UEChMMT3JnYW5pemF0aW9uMRMwEQYDVQQDEwpNeSBSb290IENBMB4XDTEwMTAxMTE3
Mzk1NloXDTE4MTAxMTE3Mzk1NVowWzELMAkGA1UEBhMCTk8xDTALBgNVBAcTBE9zbG8xET
APBgNVBAsTCE9yZyBVbml0MRUwEwYDVQQKEwxPcmdhbml6YXRpb24xEzARBgNVBAMTCk15I
FJvb3QgQ0EwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCqcVtqOLwn4JinDKMHu16
2/bxstk6I1ObSp/FLxuatquJuNJncqxNfqzGzeBg/VURRw8RMDa5laWLV6KjbX2VpHg8A4m1MsXX83zU
516RkHWzMlrr6wlnbN72VrioIDf24fwhnCtjfOJ1CsEJuxTkDFvtSFUevsbGq5J0taJrPI4eIMehrEEtnAcoX8
7GNRj3FLUSEuyTGX2pwHHkF01cSuSjl08UX1E3JwBDt1WyHFB4fHG51soczIIG9aS/vYAlIp7LNKhmE
yCv2zd+dQgS645NaFrFL7yM9LPMXA2TCJVDejh2FRwkXSDtIvojZt1fxk+Q52+5zRi7mlGzVFtf1AgMB
AAGjgZQwgZEwgY4GA1UdAQSBhjCBg4AQFGRX3nk6+CwkKk6pTLjB9qFdMFsxCzAJBgNVBAYTA
k5PMQ0wCwYDVQQHEwRPc2xvMREwDwYDVQQLEwhPcmcgVW5pdDEVMBMGA1UEChMMT3Jn
YW5pemF0aW9uMRMwEQYDVQQDEwpNeSBSb290IENBghD2V76PUvICgkkNlMjtBpaHMAkGBSsO
AwIdBQADggEBAEcjZF70sBpy3gPVv/GYeggs1pURuXxefPODLgZBT74vY0TGJvicGWTfgCjj+Tx/zXT
zW8zM6fTFLYIoYA4ZryRM11aiYfdHwJfd6dAgoSIBwEMEZspJYZ7B4g7KuQEweeJticOXOK4aK6pqT
oxMWvpLwUcBGXQfMp6Uz2zYjQw8n5XFYpe3kIiEDDH/9XRMGIteuYBAo/DvMjhbhsv9MUotK3v1oq
6tIXTjoDeDmmx6j45ZO8cRQ2wfbpjDXlJXmDkQDQD2J39dytmX+fBxDg5QHCmg62Y+rvjRoqVsth/Asi
vN16BQ0mhhvI06Zh0ORE2GQUso5ohoqdQJXDNDyVg=</X509Certificate> 
              </X509Data> 
            </KeyInfo> 
            <CipherData>            
<CipherValue>nsBgcwWvf8kqWLoDtnLqArDDsCl/m65+z8CxJuwiDC7eXTC7T6FIlfpIHC9Q5nPYS8iKS
uiyOEKx2ym2ZGcz2vrpJ9CA76UDW097Yui3YAFWPPNZWw8Y82etgogEkos8o5oyiYC9SLcJqtBBC4db
uRLmRx4uP0VMpZO0vEfyJI79dKAPy/BSVpmZBztLyeiz4SgndRL164xHuYcC9w56k0WptwHS6f58cMP
3lGwR7Y0F9MG2c8Xes2fbb9usmj9Fu+djY1oSe4Q/9mOokUTzC3TqqQWy0zse7Pwn685t5Ujp7wTovGx
w7SJDFugO36Ydd4ka1T4fpXXag9CLI93KyA==</CipherValue> 
            </CipherData> 
          </EncryptedKey> 
        </KeyInfo> 
        <CipherData>          
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<CipherValue>LhfD5A2kMxNcaeTlj4o1bpULxMlf4U64D1PyLc1NGIduNO60gwhn8OXd50UQpqnywKqc
rY39ZpFaLdtwpIYE/eSbyDtexJWtNtAyKR6fDreH0nEdH8ED51stOxVDm0J07HfEsS9pzxUCcUHHW4xL
J0T2V6J7gbmHFjt9AiWtL+aM85qcN2O9h8IoIj/LdHKH</CipherValue> 
        </CipherData> 
      </EncryptedData> 
    </SerAddress> 
  </SerCustomer> 
  <!--################################--> 
  <!-- CUSTOMER with last name Olsen  --> 
  <!--################################--> 
  <SerCustomer> 
    <Id>15</Id> 
    <LastName>Olsen</LastName> 
    <Name> 
      <EncryptedData Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Element" 
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"> 
        <EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes256-cbc"/> 
        <KeyInfo xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
          <EncryptedKey xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"> 
            <EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-1_5"/> 
            <KeyInfo xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
              <X509Data>              
<X509Certificate>MIIDzTCCArmgAwIBAgIQ9le+j1LyAoJJDZTI7QaWhzAJBgUrDgMCHQUAMFsxCz
AJBgNVBAYTAk5PMQ0wCwYDVQQHEwRPc2xvMREwDwYDVQQLEwhPcmcgVW5pdDEVMBMG
A1UEChMMT3JnYW5pemF0aW9uMRMwEQYDVQQDEwpNeSBSb290IENBMB4XDTEwMTAxMTE3
Mzk1NloXDTE4MTAxMTE3Mzk1NVowWzELMAkGA1UEBhMCTk8xDTALBgNVBAcTBE9zbG8xET
APBgNVBAsTCE9yZyBVbml0MRUwEwYDVQQKEwxPcmdhbml6YXRpb24xEzARBgNVBAMTCk15I
FJvb3QgQ0EwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCqcVtqOLwn4JinDKMHu16
2/bxstk6I1ObSp/FLxuatquJuNJncqxNfqzGzeBg/VURRw8RMDa5laWLV6KjbX2VpHg8A4m1MsXX83zU
516RkHWzMlrr6wlnbN72VrioIDf24fwhnCtjfOJ1CsEJuxTkDFvtSFUevsbGq5J0taJrPI4eIMehrEEtnAcoX8
7GNRj3FLUSEuyTGX2pwHHkF01cSuSjl08UX1E3JwBDt1WyHFB4fHG51soczIIG9aS/vYAlIp7LNKhmE
yCv2zd+dQgS645NaFrFL7yM9LPMXA2TCJVDejh2FRwkXSDtIvojZt1fxk+Q52+5zRi7mlGzVFtf1AgMB
AAGjgZQwgZEwgY4GA1UdAQSBhjCBg4AQFGRX3nk6+CwkKk6pTLjB9qFdMFsxCzAJBgNVBAYTA
k5PMQ0wCwYDVQQHEwRPc2xvMREwDwYDVQQLEwhPcmcgVW5pdDEVMBMGA1UEChMMT3Jn
YW5pemF0aW9uMRMwEQYDVQQDEwpNeSBSb290IENBghD2V76PUvICgkkNlMjtBpaHMAkGBSsO
AwIdBQADggEBAEcjZF70sBpy3gPVv/GYeggs1pURuXxefPODLgZBT74vY0TGJvicGWTfgCjj+Tx/zXT
zW8zM6fTFLYIoYA4ZryRM11aiYfdHwJfd6dAgoSIBwEMEZspJYZ7B4g7KuQEweeJticOXOK4aK6pqT
oxMWvpLwUcBGXQfMp6Uz2zYjQw8n5XFYpe3kIiEDDH/9XRMGIteuYBAo/DvMjhbhsv9MUotK3v1oq
6tIXTjoDeDmmx6j45ZO8cRQ2wfbpjDXlJXmDkQDQD2J39dytmX+fBxDg5QHCmg62Y+rvjRoqVsth/Asi
vN16BQ0mhhvI06Zh0ORE2GQUso5ohoqdQJXDNDyVg=</X509Certificate> 
              </X509Data> 
            </KeyInfo> 
            <CipherData>              
<CipherValue>Woeue9Lh3Na5rOnBAi60VADt4n7xQWmpIfPhlQ8zabBoox3ZuDCBK+bD8Ss4gkrt0wNet
Ncb8e+Cve1zh/GZ4SqfdAWEXtMnUIZbFioHGf7qdmGcaXS3AFTAq/wahCdHh3qq44Bjgt4KY72iBImF7
WOTqYL1Trb6+YlzprrocnH2EloTvNUG8y5Aer0UvzanEG5FZOgLqcuzEw/2W9mvUQ+HBo9QGrhGvT
HW/w+KJ9iFCreF9MkdE+6pqHSkotXH/88Yggs6fd7/jkxUmqxVVNoeckZ7X0X+GQ10ItnOcWO5swcl7V
1oE/OBNOYNIpSkUv6BSXP5vFl2hC4DHPkdIw==</CipherValue> 
            </CipherData> 
          </EncryptedKey> 
        </KeyInfo> 
        <CipherData>          
<CipherValue>hXAYOlAtG3dQGUil64BVB/NGOrsHhs2XbEbmrusM5bIz8FGAChM8rEUpRs7+prSh</Ci
pherValue> 
        </CipherData> 
      </EncryptedData> 
    </Name> 
    <SerAddress> 
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      <EncryptedData Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Element" 
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"> 
        <EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes256-cbc"/> 
        <KeyInfo xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
          <EncryptedKey xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"> 
            <EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-1_5"/> 
            <KeyInfo xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
              <X509Data>                
<X509Certificate>MIIDzTCCArmgAwIBAgIQ9le+j1LyAoJJDZTI7QaWhzAJBgUrDgMCHQUAMFsxCz
AJBgNVBAYTAk5PMQ0wCwYDVQQHEwRPc2xvMREwDwYDVQQLEwhPcmcgVW5pdDEVMBMG
A1UEChMMT3JnYW5pemF0aW9uMRMwEQYDVQQDEwpNeSBSb290IENBMB4XDTEwMTAxMTE3
Mzk1NloXDTE4MTAxMTE3Mzk1NVowWzELMAkGA1UEBhMCTk8xDTALBgNVBAcTBE9zbG8xET
APBgNVBAsTCE9yZyBVbml0MRUwEwYDVQQKEwxPcmdhbml6YXRpb24xEzARBgNVBAMTCk15I
FJvb3QgQ0EwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCqcVtqOLwn4JinDKMHu16
2/bxstk6I1ObSp/FLxuatquJuNJncqxNfqzGzeBg/VURRw8RMDa5laWLV6KjbX2VpHg8A4m1MsXX83zU
516RkHWzMlrr6wlnbN72VrioIDf24fwhnCtjfOJ1CsEJuxTkDFvtSFUevsbGq5J0taJrPI4eIMehrEEtnAcoX8
7GNRj3FLUSEuyTGX2pwHHkF01cSuSjl08UX1E3JwBDt1WyHFB4fHG51soczIIG9aS/vYAlIp7LNKhmE
yCv2zd+dQgS645NaFrFL7yM9LPMXA2TCJVDejh2FRwkXSDtIvojZt1fxk+Q52+5zRi7mlGzVFtf1AgMB
AAGjgZQwgZEwgY4GA1UdAQSBhjCBg4AQFGRX3nk6+CwkKk6pTLjB9qFdMFsxCzAJBgNVBAYTA
k5PMQ0wCwYDVQQHEwRPc2xvMREwDwYDVQQLEwhPcmcgVW5pdDEVMBMGA1UEChMMT3Jn
YW5pemF0aW9uMRMwEQYDVQQDEwpNeSBSb290IENBghD2V76PUvICgkkNlMjtBpaHMAkGBSsO
AwIdBQADggEBAEcjZF70sBpy3gPVv/GYeggs1pURuXxefPODLgZBT74vY0TGJvicGWTfgCjj+Tx/zXT
zW8zM6fTFLYIoYA4ZryRM11aiYfdHwJfd6dAgoSIBwEMEZspJYZ7B4g7KuQEweeJticOXOK4aK6pqT
oxMWvpLwUcBGXQfMp6Uz2zYjQw8n5XFYpe3kIiEDDH/9XRMGIteuYBAo/DvMjhbhsv9MUotK3v1oq
6tIXTjoDeDmmx6j45ZO8cRQ2wfbpjDXlJXmDkQDQD2J39dytmX+fBxDg5QHCmg62Y+rvjRoqVsth/Asi
vN16BQ0mhhvI06Zh0ORE2GQUso5ohoqdQJXDNDyVg=</X509Certificate> 
              </X509Data> 
            </KeyInfo> 
            <CipherData> 
<CipherValue>JQua/+gmrZeauoJ51acPrKSzII72aFvEbD091z9MdrJ5dGjAz9c+QllQoa6b3dJvjvaosI0+XeQ
mq97h3hJyoeQU6PDVDNTj4vfkYFupXT3zJcHkzx4HNfYgKFK03wVRqAQ9GhOSBKq0EClltuUhTny+
W3z0RrM1+aQu6s1z+32gpGOgQwwYntf1tG0VgxAKnl/KOyYMIAEg3L4MksFkt/Yrc/QsBN7TCcLwoP2
2nrX/8sUCyjzXV7TG1yH0iQL2vgmFsc+Y51cIFVOIWQNdXr1tppzd/rmwvunmOjEFIQO4dYdn7H3dprO
cQQphXTLF1/BHWrC7CxWGZ/sCB+6JXQ==</CipherValue> 
            </CipherData> 
          </EncryptedKey> 
        </KeyInfo> 
        <CipherData>  
<CipherValue>nYMjAiI+ZARr20O54Laa66wrvnuNw9nKi0V9olTDDfZ6doGNbKzwhIK+x89FbgJvDN1Y
M1XMuWnVvK0EoxfoV5OkLMekcISgpKAlOfGHKd8JyL5nl25IJbl3qAZKeDK+gYdmK+u0m59UnwbM
80llVrYBwdNz7LA98+xaIBsCQj/+/45T46SjutpstegzV7kB</CipherValue> 
        </CipherData> 
      </EncryptedData> 
    </SerAddress> 
  </SerCustomer> 
</ArrayOfSerCustomer> 
Figure 4.6: XML message containing two customers where Name and SerAddress 
elements are encrypted 
 
 By looking at the previous figure we may notice how elements like 
EncryptedData/EncryptionMethod, 
EncryptedData/KeyInfo/EncryptedKey/EncryptionMethod and 
EncryptedData/KeyInfo/EncryptedKey/KeyInfo contains exactly same values for both 
customers. In fact all three elements are repeated four times because Name and 
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SerAddress-elements are encrypted for each customer. These repetitions occur due to the 
fact that elements may be protected by using multiple keys. Although XML Encryption is a 
highly flexible standard with multiple configuration options, there is no logic for 
deprecating duplicate elements like the ones we mentioned. The message in this state is not 
very readable and it is too large as well. The encrypted message is much larger than its 
original. To be more precise, the original message is approximately 508 bytes in size while 
the encrypted one is 9,66 KB. In order to make the encrypted message more readable as 
well as to decrease its size, we could implement a logic that will eliminate duplicates after 
encryption process but also restore eliminated elements when the message reaches its final 
destination. We need to be careful when restoring the original message state because if it is 
not restored properly then the signature validation process or decryption process will fail.  
 Now, if the logic is implemented in .NET then it will tie our solution even more to 
one specific platform. Fortunately, there are cross-platform technologies like XPath and 
XSLT that can be used to achieve the transformation logic[5](p.96-97). Since XPath and 
XSLT are optimized for XML manipulation and use XML syntax, we find the idea of 
implementing logic that will remove and recreate elements very feasible. By following this 
idea we ensure that our solution is less platform-dependent while keeping the .NET code 
clearly separated from the transformation logic. The latter is a part of a design principle 
known as separation of concerns which goal is to create systems so that separated layers 
can be developed independently, thus making it easier to understand, design and 
manage[104]. In the chapter 5 we will see how this principle was implemented on the rest 
of our solution. Following figure summarizes the design discussion. 
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Figure 4.7: Process of protecting and unprotecting a RESTful message 
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4.4 Summary 
 In the previous sections of this chapter we described the architecture and design of 
our forthcoming solution. We concluded that HTTP Digest authentication is to be used as 
the authentication mechanism while digital certificates will be used as the cryptography 
token due to its widespread usage. We also proposed a new way to distribute certificates, 
especially self-signed ones, by the use of email and phone. This is done in order to keep 
the security architecture simple. Cryptography operations cannot take place at the .NET 
type level since it is very difficult to enable partial encryption on the programing language 
types. Instead cryptography will be implemented at the XML level only as this will impact 
both XML and JSON because WCF use XML as a temporary format when serializing and 
deserializing objects to and from JSON. As a result of that it will be implemented common 
code to secure both formats. After studying different cryptography mechanisms we found 
XML Signature and XML Encryption to be optimal choices for our solution. Still, since 
both standards generate a lot of information we will use XSLT to create simple and 
readable messages before shipping them to its destination. This way we create more 
interoperable artifacts so that different platforms may understand those and reuse them. 
 Here we conclude the architecture and design chapter and leave the description of 
the realization and implementation details to the next. 
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5 Implementation 
5.1 Intro 
 This chapter is about code implementation from the design discussed in the 
previous chapter. The customer registry system case study scenario will be used so as to 
demonstrate a particular scenario although the solution is intended to be useful on many 
other scenarios.  
 We start the chapter by presenting a software development methodology which we 
followed during the development of our solution. Furthermore, we will give a presentation 
of the case study system and the RESTful service that is based on it. Then we move onto 
the implementation of the new security library and message compression library. Finally, 
the chapter ends by presenting couple of results related to comparison of protected and 
compressed messages versus protected and uncompressed messages.  
5.2 Software development methodology 
 In order to have a more structured and possibly successful software development, a 
specific project methodology should be followed. There exist many project methodologies 
and some of the most famous are related to agile software development[105]. Examples of 
agile software development methods are Extreme Programming, Feature Driven 
Development and SCRUM. The characteristics of such methodologies are their 
responsiveness to changing requirements. This is for instance important in project based 
development where technology is new and unfamiliar to the developers. With the intension 
of following a specific agile methodology we found SCRUM to be the optimal one for our 
development process. 
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The strong points of SCRUM are that many development processes cannot be predicted 
hence an exact development description is not required because it will likely change during 
the development[101]. The methodology also gives space for change of the initial plan as 
we make progress. According to SCRUM, prior to starting on the development we should 
have created a product backlog[101]. Product backlog is a list of prioritized requirements 
or functionalities which will keep a team or a developer focused on the primary work. In 
our case we needed to base primary requirements on the use case chosen for the project 
and keep them in the product backlog. Our initial product backlog had following 
requirements for the functionality. 
 
Table 5.1: Product backlog 
Item 
no. Description 
Estimation 
(hours) 
  Create customer registry system   
1 Design customer database 1
2 Create customer database 1
3 Design customer registry system 1
4 Develop & test customer registry system 8
  Create RESTful services for the customer registry system   
5 Design RESTful service 1,5
6 Develop & test service 12
7 Develop & test a client 6
  Create .NET library for signature & encryption   
8 Design encryption and signature implementation 5
9 Develop the library 20
  
Create library for dynamic XPath generation used for finding types & their 
properties prior to signature and encryption   
10 Design of the library 3
11 Develop & test library for XPath generation 12
  Create XSLT transformations for message compression and decompression   
12 Understand the JSON XML format 4
13 Design compression/decompression process 7
14 Create transformation from secured plain XML to its compressed variant 15
15 Create transformation from compressed XML message to its original variant 15
16 Create transformation from secured JSON XML message to its compressed variant 10
17 Create transformation from compressed JSON XML message to its original variant 10
  Finalize the solution   
18 Adapt new libraries with the service and the client 6
19 Tie the whole solution together and run final tests 25
Sum:   162,5
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 It is important to have in mind that this product backlog was created in a time 
period where we did not have much knowledge about most of the technologies used in this 
project and estimations were likely to change on the way. The next step was to create a 
sprint backlog which is a list of concrete development tasks based on the items defined in 
the product backlog. After breaking the items into development tasks we managed to 
define 85 tasks in total. When it comes to the development process itself, SCRUM splits it 
into several smaller development periods called sprints. A sprint usually last for two to 
four weeks and at its end a team should have a piece of code that is fully functional and 
tested. During a sprint we are not allowed to add new change requests but we are allowed 
to refactor the code as much as it is needed. It means that after the first sprint we should 
have created and tested customer registry system, RESTful services for the registry system, 
new C# library for signature and encryption, and library for generating dynamic XPath 
expressions. However, since there is only one developer involved in the coding process it 
was convenient to have each sprint last for one week. In this manner we encouraged 
ourselves to have functional code available more often and in a testable state. Since we 
calculated with a seven hour workdays we initially created five sprints so to complete the 
development. 
5.3 Customer registry system 
 The customer registry system is a business system that our use case is based on. It 
was developed as part of sprint 1 and uses a SQL Server database to store and query 
customer data. The system is very simple offering basic operations for maintaining 
customers. Class diagram in Figure 5.2 demonstrates relationships between two entities, 
Customer and Address where Address is part of Customer class. The whole system is 
designed as an n-tier application where each tier or layer is responsible to handle separate 
logic. On top of model classes there is a data access layer class CustomerDal and an 
interface ICustomedDal which are responsible to store and retrieve data from the database. 
Data access layer is consumed by business logic layer which involves a class, CustomerBll 
and an interface ICustumerBll. Business logic layer is the layer used for communication 
with other applications and offers six operations; DeleteCustomer, GetCustomerById, 
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GetListOfCustomers, GetListOfCustomersByName, InsertCustomer and UpdateCustomer. 
Figure 5.1 shows how the system is layered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Customer registry system layers 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Customer registry class diagram 
5.4 Customer registry RESTful services 
 Customer registry RESTful service, developed using Windows Communication 
Foundation (WCF), resides on top of the customer registry business logic layer and 
ICustomerDal (Data access layer) 
ICustomerBll (Businees logic layer) 
Customer database 
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exposes almost all of business logic layer’s operations. Interface ICustomerService and the 
class CustomerService define the service layer on top of ICustomerBll while the 
SerCustomer and SerAddress represent server entities which values are mapped to and 
from customer registry system entities, Customer and Address. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Customer registry RESTful service layers 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Customer registry RESTful service diagram 
 
 For a client those interfaces and classes are irrelevant as the only way for it to speak 
with the service is through the URI and HTTP methods. The binding between 
ICustomerService and the URI is presented in the following table. 
ICustomerDal (Data access layer) 
ICustomerBll (Businees logic layer) 
Customer database 
ICustomerService (Service layer) 
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Table 5.2: Customer RESTful service details 
.NET operation URI Method Input Output 
DeleteCustomerById http://localhost:8090/Service/Customers/{id} DELETE n/a n/a 
GetCustomerById http://localhost:8090/Service/Customers/{id} GET n/a customer 
GetListOfCustomers http://localhost:8090/Service/Customers GET n/a 
customers 
array 
InsertCustomer http://localhost:8090/Service/Customers POST customer customer 
UpdateCustomer http://localhost:8090/Service/Customers PUT customer customer 
 
 From Table 5.2 we see that the service is hosted on the HTTP address 
http://localhost:8090/Service. Customers is the relative URI which is used to invoke 
customer related operations. Some operations like the ones for insertion and updating 
require SerCustomer serialized object as part of the HTTP body in the request and will also 
produce an updated SerCustomer object. Other operations like the ones to get a 
SerCustomer object or a list of objects require no inputs while delete operation neither 
requires an input nor produces an output.  Indeed, deletion operation is in very contrast to 
the SOAP counterpart which demands input and produces an output thus justifying 
message-level security. In our case the customer ID is part of the URI which is used to 
delete a specific customer based on its identification key so there is no reason of sending a 
serialized object to the operation. One may say that by sending an unencrypted customer 
ID to the other side, we expose critical data unprotected. The answer is that only an 
authorized party may send such unprotected requests. Additionally, the customer ID will 
represent nothing to a sniffing third party since it is the only customer item visible. In order 
to make the ID more puzzling, it can be randomly created containing a mix of randomized 
characters which will help even more in concealing the details about the ID itself.   
 We believe that our service operations cover enough scenarios in order to test the 
message-level security. Through insert and update operations we are able to test fully 
secured message interchange. Operations to retrieve customer data are testing secured 
message exchange from one party while the delete operation is a scenario where the 
message-level security is unnecessary. 
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5.5 Security library 
 The new security library is much based on the idea available for the SOAP 
messages in WCF. The functionality was discussed in section 4.2 where we shortly 
described how types and its members are supposed to be separately protected by using 
ProtectionLevel-enumeration. The final protection of the selected types and members 
happens after serialization, i.e. on the SOAP-message itself. Unfortunately, as already 
mentioned earlier, many others including ourselves, did not succeed to make it work but 
we found the idea to be very elegant. Finally, we borrowed the idea and made it work for 
RESTful services. In fact, since RESTful Services and Web Services share same set of 
attributes to mark different types and members for serialization, our code should also work 
on SOAP messages although this was never tested. Following demonstrates a code snippet 
used to mark Street and PostalCode-members for encryption and signature, and mark 
SerAddress-type for signature only. 
 
namespace Samples.Rest.Model 
{ 
    [ProtectionMember(ProtectionLevel.Sign)] 
    [DataContract((Name=”Address”, Namespace = "")] 
    public class SerAddress 
    { 
        [DataMember] 
        public int Id { get; set; } 
        [DataMember, ProtectionMember(ProtectionLevel.EncryptAndSign)] 
        public string Street { get; set; } 
        [DataMember, ProtectionMember(ProtectionLevel.EncryptAndSign)] 
        public int PostalCode { get; set; } 
        [DataMember] 
        public string City { get; set; } 
 
    } 
} 
Figure 5.5: Adding protection on an existing entity 
 
 In the good spirit of programming we were encouraged to reuse existing 
functionality whenever possible. The only new code we introduced in Figure 5.5 is the 
ProtectionMember-attribute which is used to mark the types and members for protection. 
We reused ProtectionLevel-enumeration for specifying type of protection we want to apply 
on the different parts of the message. If we again look closer at Figure 5.5 we see that we 
are using ProtectionLevel-enumeration together with DataContract and DataMember-
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attributes while the code in Figure 4.2 is using ProtectionLevel with MessageContract and 
MessageMember-attributes. The truth is that the latter two attributes are supposed to be 
used in connection with the serialization of the SOAP messages only while the former ones 
are generic for RESTful and SOAP messages. That may explain why DataContract and 
DataMembers-attributes did not have any protection capabilities prior to our code. 
 The way our new library operates is by intercepting the automatic serialization 
process to read the names of types and members with DataContract and DataMember-
attributes, read their ProtectionMember-attribute and stores the read data in a temporary 
structure. When the object becomes serialized the data in temporary structure is then 
translated to a structure containing XPath expressions. XPath expressions are created 
dynamically and used to navigate to the XML representation of types and members marked 
for protection. When  specified elements are found they will be passed on to the XML 
Encryption and XML Signature. XPath expressions will also handle DataContract with 
namespaces and DataContract and DataMember with serialized name aliases. 
 Now, when the ProtectionLevel is sat on higher level member, what should be 
default behavior for the lower level members with the same or similar ProtectionLevel? 
For instance, should we have to re-sign Street and PostalCode-members after signing 
SerAddress-type? We do not see any logical reason for encrypting or signing an element as 
long as the parent has the same protection level. Yes, there might be cases where the 
signature from a party should be applied on elements already signed by another party, but 
to keep it simple, our solution does not support multiple signatures. Neither does it support 
superencryption. To be able to support our preferred logic we created a functionality that 
always checks root type’s ProtectionLevel and then its child members for the same value. 
Looking at the Figure 5.5 it means that when the code discovers ProtectionLevel.Sign on 
the SerAddress it will search for the same or similar value on its members and discover 
ProtectionLevel.EncryptAndSign on Street and PostalCode-elements. Then it will create a 
protection plan based on the findings which will result in Street and PostalCode being 
encrypted and then SerAddress signed. In such manner we will avoid creating extra 
computational and data overhead as Street and PostalCode will not be separately signed. 
This logic will also apply on complex hierarchical types with multiple levels of non-
primitive members and collection structures. 
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 The process of unprotecting messages or their elements start when the message is 
received. Our code will intercept the deserialization process, validate the signature, find all 
encrypted elements and then try to decrypt those. Once the message is in clear text the 
process of deserialization will continue. 
5.6 Compressing protected messages 
 According to our design, when the message is protected by the new security library, 
the next step in the process is to decrease its size by grouping and removing repeating 
elements. When the message is received by the other party the compressed messages needs 
to be restored into its original form. Before we can start describing the compression 
process we need to understand the XML code produced by both the XML Signature and 
the XML Encryption. For the introduction on XML Signature and XML Encryption please 
refer to sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2. 
 When XML Encryption encrypts each element it will replace it with 
EncryptedData-element which will contain the ciphertext and other metadata information 
that describe the way encryption was implemented. The metadata information may vary 
depending on the several properties such as the encryption token. In our case, since we are 
using X.509 certificate as the encryption token, data related to the certificate is generated 
as well as metadata related to the asymmetric algorithm, session key used for data 
encryption and session key algorithm. As a result of the one certificate constraint that we 
imposed, we realize that the certificate metadata will be redundant in each encrypted 
element. Additionally, since there is a little point of specifying different types of 
asymmetric and symmetric algorithms for every element, we found the algorithm metadata 
to be unnecessary repeatable. That leaves us with the only one metadata that is truly unique 
per each element and that is the symmetric key used for the encryption. While we are 
aware that one session key could be used for the encryption of all elements, it would 
require certain custom coding. The combination of X.509 certificate and custom generated 
session key would make our solution less standardized so that other platforms would have 
difficulties communicating with the service. Furthermore, XML Encryption would still 
generate all the metadata mentioned above even if we did use only one session key. 
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 When repeatable and unique elements are identified, they will be grouped 
accordingly. The repeatable elements will then be deleted until there are no duplicates left. 
Similar logic exists for the XML Signature as well. The compressing and decompressing 
work is done by XSLT. Per today there exist four XSLT transformations and they are all 
JSON XML specific. The first two transforms encrypted and signed JSON XML to 
compressed JSON XML while the last two reverse the process. The same transformations 
do not exist for the plain XML messages because of the limited development period but the 
transformations for the plain XML should be easier than those for JSON XML because 
JSON XML have to follow a certain structure in order to be processed correctly by the 
serialization procedure. Figure 5.6 shows a segment from a JSON XML document where 
we see encrypted PostalCode and Street-elements before compression. Figure 5.7 shows 
the compressed version of the same segment.  
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<PostalCode type="number"> 
        <EncryptedData Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Element" 
 xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"> 
          <EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes256-cbc" /> 
          <KeyInfo xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
            <EncryptedKey xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"> 
              <EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-1_5" /> 
              <KeyInfo xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
                <X509Data> 
                  <X509Certificate>MIIDzTCCAr…</X509Certificate> 
                </X509Data> 
              </KeyInfo> 
              <CipherData> 
                <CipherValue>WAzSJM6E…</CipherValue> 
              </CipherData> 
            </EncryptedKey> 
          </KeyInfo> 
          <CipherData> 
            <CipherValue>l3ipRPA…CipherValue> 
          </CipherData> 
        </EncryptedData> 
</PostalCode> 
<Street> 
        <EncryptedData Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Element"  
 xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"> 
          <EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes256-cbc" /> 
          <KeyInfo xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
            <EncryptedKey xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"> 
              <EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-1_5" /> 
              <KeyInfo xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
                <X509Data> 
                  <X509Certificate>MIIDzTCCAr…</X509Certificate> 
                </X509Data> 
              </KeyInfo> 
              <CipherData> 
                <CipherValue>Pk8Qd5jukK…CipherValue> 
              </CipherData> 
            </EncryptedKey> 
          </KeyInfo> 
          <CipherData> 
            <CipherValue>gOcrtwamn…CipherValue> 
          </CipherData> 
        </EncryptedData> 
</Street> 
Figure 5.6: Encrypted PostalCode and Street-elements 
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<PostalCode type="object"> 
        <EncryptedData type="object"> 
          <JsonType>number</JsonType> 
          <DataCipherValue>dPVPQqvzsdvlaJJ+… </DataCipherValue> 
          <KeyCipherValue>e4rAm/…</KeyCipherValue> 
        </EncryptedData> 
 </PostalCode> 
<Street type="object"> 
        <EncryptedData type="object"> 
          <JsonType>string</JsonType> 
          <DataCipherValue>rngHVBWig…</DataCipherValue> 
          <KeyCipherValue>XbeWZLp3AI…</ KeyCipherValue> 
        </EncryptedData> 
      </Street> 
</SerAddress> 
<EncryptedDataRef type="object"> 
      <X509Certificate> MIIDzTCCAr…</X509Certificate> 
      <DataEncrytionMethod>http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes256-cbc</DataEncrytionMethod> 
      <KeyEncrytionMethod>http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-1_5</KeyEncrytionMethod> 
</EncryptedDataRef> 
Figure 5.7: Encrypted and compressed PostalCode and Street-elements 
 
 The implemented process of protecting and unprotecting a message is summarized 
by the following activity diagram. 
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Figure 5.8: Customer registry RESTful service activity diagram 
 
5.6.1 Original versus compressed 
 The difference in size between the original and compressed message will get even 
more drastic as the amount of encrypted elements increases. EncryptedDataRef-element in 
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the compressed version of the message will always contain only three metadata sub-
elements per message, unconstrained by the amount of the encrypted elements. Each 
encrypted element will be replaced by EncryptedData-element with three metadata sub-
elements. Compared to the EncryptedData-element of the original, uncompressed message, 
the original one will always contain eleven sub-elements per encrypted element. Table 5.3 
shows the difference in amount of metadata elements generated in the original and the 
compressed message when amount of encrypted elements varies. 
 
Table 5.3: Amount of metadata elements per amount of encrypted elements 
Amount of encrypted 
elements 
Original message  
(EncryptedData & 11 sub-elements 
per encrypted element) 
Compressed message  
(EncryptedData & 3 sub-elements 
per encrypted element + 
EncryptedDataRef & 3 sub-elements 
per message) 
1 12 8
3 36 16
5 60 24
7 84 32
9 108 40
 
 
Figure 5.9: Data from Table 5.3 
 
 When it comes to the file size, the difference between uncompressed and 
compressed messages is even bigger. The big difference is caused by XML attributes 
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which are present in the redundant elements, in the original message. Another reason is 
redundant elements values. Following table and figure demonstrates this difference. 
 
Table 5.4: File size where each customer has Street and PostalCode encrypted and signed 
Amount of customers 
(Street and PostalCode-elements are encrypted and signed) 
Uncompressed Compressed 
1 12 KB 5 KB 
2 21 KB 6 KB 
3 31 KB 8 KB 
4 40 KB 9 KB 
5 50 KB 10 KB 
 
 
Figure 5.10: Data from Table 5.4 
 
 Looking at Figure 5.9 and Figure 5.10 we can confirm that compressed messages 
will be even more compact than the uncompressed ones when the amount of protected 
elements increases. According to Figure 5.9, while a compressed message with one 
encrypted element contained 33,3% less metadata, the percentage was 63% less with nine 
encrypted elements. When it comes to the message size, a compressed message containing 
a single customer with two encrypted and signed elements was 58% smaller than the 
uncompressed message while a compressed message with five customers was 1/5 of the 
size compared to the original. In addition to being much smaller we also believe that the 
compressed messages are much more human readable then their original counterparts. 
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 Nevertheless, in fairness to the uncompressed message we should mention that our 
solution implements XML Signature with the Object-element instead of Reference-
element. The big difference between those two elements is in the way they store 
information about signed objects. While the Object-element will contain a copy of the 
signed object, Reference-element will contain only the reference to it. Since the new 
library eliminates duplicate metadata, it will also remove copied object in the Object-
element and create a reference to the signed element. Using built-in reference functionality 
would be a better solution because original uncompressed messages would be smaller and 
we would avoid creating and recreating signed elements as the situation is today. 
 
 
Figure 5.11: A compressed JSON message with encrypted and signed Street and 
PostalCode-elements, shown in JSON Viewer 
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5.7 Summary 
 This chapter gave an explanation of the work done regarding the implementation of 
the design. We showed how case scenario and the RESTful service were created and 
relation between the two. Further on, we demonstrated code snippets from the security 
library and gave an explanation on how library works. The chapter ended by explaining 
how message compression and decompression were implemented in order to provide light 
and human readable protected messages. 
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6 Evaluation 
 
The final question is, did we fulfill predictions as stated in section 2.3 and what is the 
result of the hypothesis? Let us review the predictions and give a short explanation for 
each of them. 
P1:   The new artifact, message protection library, will enable encryption and digital 
signatures on XML and JSON messages. 
Yes, the security library does support encryption and digital signature for both formats. We 
consider this prediction to be fulfilled. 
 
P2: The new artifact will support partial encryption and partial digital signature. 
Yes, the message can be fully and partially encrypted and signed, and does support 
different combination schemes like encrypting a single element and then sign the complete 
message. We consider this prediction to be fulfilled. 
 
P3: The new artifact will enable message compression and decompression on 
protected messages so to decrease message size. 
When XML Encryption and XML Signature are utilized messages become significantly 
large. Yet, by compressing the message it becomes smaller in size and easier to read. We 
succeed in compressing the temporary JSON XML format which reflects JSON format 
itself. Plain XML were not compressed due to the lack of development time. That is why 
we consider this prediction to be partially fulfilled. 
 
P4: The new security solution will be easily adoptable by existing and standard WCF 
RESTful services. 
We strongly believe that the security code can be added on the existing and standard WCF 
projects without having to rewrite the code. This is what we did in our case study where we 
enabled security after the RESTful service was fully developed. We consider this 
prediction to be fulfilled. 
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Through the evaluation of the predictions we are now able to conclude the 
hypothesis H1. Three out of four predictions were fulfilled while P3 was partially fulfilled. 
Yet, we have stated that the task regarding compression of the plain XMLs was not 
finished due to the lack of development time, i.e. task should be solved if we had more 
time. As clearly stated by the research methodology, “Technology research does not 
always produce artifacts that are complete, regarded from a user’s point of view.”[98](p.8). 
It continues with “If the prototype looks promising, it can later on be elaborated to a 
complete, saleable product. Such finalization is typically done by other people than 
researchers.”[98](p.8). Therefore, we conclude P3 to be accepted as fulfilled which results 
to the conclusion that H1 is true. 
Hence we state that: Solution proposed does enable message-level security for RESTful 
services on .NET platform. 
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7 Conclusion and further work 
7.1 Conclusion 
 The purpose of this thesis was to present a complete solution for the message-level 
security for RESTful services. The solution we presented is primarily consisting of the 
newly added security library but we also recommended authentication mechanism and 
demonstrated a non-technical approach for token distribution which we consider 
appropriate because of its simplicity. The solution was developed because no other similar 
solutions seem to exist. The new security library and our recommendations were tested 
with a case scenario although the solution is intended to be generic and not tailored for any 
specific application. Through the design and implementation process we focused strongly 
on the interoperability and multi-platform adoption. That is why the security library is 
based on well-known standards, XML Encryption and XML Signature, while the message 
compression and decompression is based on transformations developed in XSLT. 
7.2 Contribution 
This thesis has successfully demonstrated a new security mechanism for RESTful 
services. Through this work following has been achieved: 
• Designed and implemented probably the very first prototype for message-
level security for RESTful services. 
• Identified reusable security components and still kept protected messages 
small and readable. 
• Message protection with platform-independent components which enables 
easier adoption by solutions developed in other development platforms. 
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• Proposed a feasible certificate distribution procedure. 
7.3 Further work 
As many other developers, we would like our proposed solution to be considered 
useful to others. If the solution seems to be useful then it might be actually used in other 
scenario and provide better tests cases then we have today. Perhaps a group of people may 
be formed to maintain the code by fixing the bugs and consider possible extensions to that 
code. Someone will not consider the complete solution to be useful but may consider parts 
of it to be relevant for their requirements. At last, if the solution seems inappropriate we 
hope that someone may be inspired by the ideas behind this work and start on their own 
projects.  
The following sections describe certain fields which could require further 
investigation and development. 
7.3.1 Message compression 
 Although we did a lot of work protecting the message content and working on the 
compressing process, we did not complete transformation of protected XML messages into 
their compressed variant. There is not much work left on finishing this task but then we 
could ask ourselves if those transformations could be further optimized. The answer to that 
question is probably yes, even though we spent days on figuring out how to make the 
XSLT code more efficient. Optimization is a process that takes a lot of time and testing 
before one can conclude to have a solid performing piece of code. 
7.3.2 Caching 
Caching, if is used correctly, will highly improve performance for HTTP resources 
including RESTful services. In our work we did not concentrate on this area because it can 
be very challenging to enable both cache and message-level security together since there 
are many places on the Internet that might cache old response messages. In our opinion 
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caching is an important feature that should be studied further so as to find a way for it to 
co-exist with protected messages without side effects. 
7.3.3 Authentication 
 In this thesis we recommended a solution for authentication that is based on the 
existing HTTP authentication mechanism. However, we feel that authentication could be 
solved in a more secure and modern way by utilizing OAuth which we shortly mentioned 
in section 4.3.2. The main reason why we feel OAuth to be more appropriate than HTTP 
Digest is that through OAuth a user sends tokens instead of credentials. Those tokens will 
then be validated by an external service and the service will make tokens last for a 
predefined time period only[100]. HTTP Digest hashed passwords on the other hand, could 
be intercepted and used in offline password guessing attacks.  
7.3.4 Certificate distribution 
Our solution for certificate distribution is intended for a smaller group of people. It 
is a relatively secure solution but a manual one. In the world of certificates there is nothing 
wrong with that. There are many other cases where manual certificate distribution is 
required, for instance, European Association for the Streamlining of Energy Exchange 
offers certificates of all of its members by downloading them from their member site[96]. 
Yet, we feel that an “automatic” solution could be more appropriate. XKMS, as described 
in section 3.5.3, is such a solution but it is very complex for REST architecture and it 
highly depends on Web Services for registration and distribution of keys or certificates. A 
similar solution for RESTful services could be designed according to REST principles and 
strive to be simple. 
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Appendix A   DVD content 
 This chapter describes the contents of the DVD appended to this thesis.  
The DVD consists of a folder Customer registry system which contains folders as shown in 
Figure A1. 
 
 
Figure A1: Customer registry system folder structure 
 
 
 The folder contains a .NET solution called Samples.sln. This .NET solution 
includes all the .NET projects that are inside Customer registry system-folder. The solution 
can be used directly to run the case study scenario application. Following shows the .NET 
solution and its projects when opened in Visual Studio 2008. 
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Figure A2: Samples.sln 
 
Description of the subfolders 
Certificates-folder 
Contains a test certificate that was used to test the solution. May be further used for testing 
purposes. Must be imported to the certificate store on desired test machine. Importing 
process depends on the operating system. 
 
 
Helper-folder 
Contains a Helper-project and three helper-classes related to XML handling. Helper-
project may be used by all projects. 
 
 
Figure A3: Helper-project 
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Logic-folder 
Logic-folder represents Customer registry standalone system. It contains five projects 
which contains an entity project (Model), data access layer projects (IDal and Dal) and 
business logic layer projects (IBll and Bll). 
 
 
Figure A4: Customer registry standalone system project structure 
 
 
Rest-folder 
Contains two projects representing the Customer registry RESTful service. RESTful 
service is dependent on business logic layer in the Logic-folder, as described in section 5.4. 
The project Model contains server entities and project Service contains the service logic. 
There exist references to IBll, Bll and Model-projects from the Service-project. 
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Figure A5: RESTful service project structure 
 
 
Security-folder 
Security folder contains a .NET project called Cryptography which includes all classes and 
XSLT-files to enable message-level security upon a Message-object. Message-type is a 
WCF specific type containing all the context and content related to SOAP, plain XML, 
JSON or other messages. This project is referred to as the new security library or the new 
artefact.  
  
 
Figure A6: The new security library project structure 
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Test-folder 
Contains a .NET-project Dal which contains a single class, CustomerDalTest.cs, that will 
recreate the tables in the database (but it will not create database) and populate the data in 
the tables. The class will also perform various data logic layer tests as such as to retrieve 
customers from the database. 
 
 
Figure A7: Test project 
Appendix B   Sample code explanation 
114 
 
Description of the subfolders 
115 
 
 
Appendix B   Sample code explanation 
 In order to implement the new security library on the existing project we may study 
the code in Customer registry RESTful service, Service-project. The process of securing 
the existing code can be summarized in following way: 
 
 
A. Set Protection level on entities 
 Set desired protection level on your entity types or/and their members and create 
OnSerializingMethod in exactly same way as shown in the following figure. 
 
[DataContract(Namespace = "")] 
    public class SerAddress 
    { 
        [DataMember] 
        public int Id { get; set; } 
        [DataMember, ProtectionMember(ProtectionLevel.EncryptAndSign)] 
        public string Street { get; set; } 
        [DataMember, ProtectionMember(ProtectionLevel.EncryptAndSign)] 
        public int PostalCode { get; set; } 
        [DataMember] 
        public string City { get; set; } 
 
 
        [OnSerializing()] 
        internal void OnSerializingMethod(StreamingContext context) 
        { 
            IEnumerable<ProtectionInfo> listOfSecuredElements = new           
            ProtectionInfoGenerator(this.GetType()).CreateListOfProtectionMembers(); 
 
            foreach (ProtectionInfo securedElement in  listOfSecuredElements) 
            { 
              OperationContext.Current.OutgoingMessageProperties 
             .Add(AutoId.GetNext().ToString(), securedElement); 
            } 
        } 
    } 
Figure A8: Type with different protection levels 
 
 OnSerializingMethod-method is used to remember the protection level state of the 
type and its members. It is a static piece of code and must be added to all types where 
protection is requested. 
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B. Implement the IDispatchMessageInspector and call the security library 
 IDispatchMessageInspectore is a WCF interface used to inspect the messages 
before they are serialized or deserialized on the server side. When the interface is 
implemented, call the new security library from the interface methods BeforeSendReply or 
AfterReceiveRequest. Following demonstrates the code from the BeforeSendReply-method 
where types will be protected before being sent. 
 
public void BeforeSendReply(ref Message reply, object correlationState) 
{ 
       try 
       { 
           MessageProperties messageProperties = OperationContext.Current.OutgoingMessageProperties; 
           string contentType = WebOperationContext.Current.IncomingRequest.ContentType; 
           CertificateX509 certX509 = new CertificateX509("CN=My Root CA, O=Organization, OU=Org   
                                                                                          Unit, L=Oslo, C=NO"); 
           RestMessageSecurity restSecurity = new RestMessageSecurity(reply, contentType); 
           restSecurity.ContentOnly = true; 
           reply = restSecurity.GetSecuredMessage(messageProperties, certX509); 
       } 
       catch (Exception ex) 
       { 
           OutgoingWebResponseContext response = WebOperationContext.Current.OutgoingResponse; 
           response.StatusCode = HttpStatusCode.BadRequest; // or anything you want 
           response.StatusDescription = ex.Message; 
           reply = null; 
       } 
} 
Figure A9: Calling the new security library 
 
 The process in Figure A9 starts by collecting all the types that are marked for 
protection (messageProperties). contentType is a string variable that describes which 
format should the type be serialized to. CertificateX509 is a custom class and part of the 
new security library. It is used for validation and retrieving of the certificate from the 
certificate store. RestMessageSecurity is also part of the new library and is used to protect 
and unprotect messages. In addition, it is also responsible to compress and decompress the 
messages. Finally, GetSecuredMessage is a method responsible to trigger the protection 
and compression process, and return the message in XML format. This concludes the 
protection process and after this stage the message is in control of the WCF serialization. 
When serialization is done WCF will send the message to its requestor. 
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